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THE VALIDITY OF DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES IN  
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITION OR MERGER TRANSACTIONS  
UNDER ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 
 
Wai Yee Wan* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes deal protection devices, specifically termination fees and lockup 
agreements, that are entered into by publicly listed target companies in favor of the 
bidders, under Anglo-American law. U.S. (specifically Delaware) and U.K. law and 
regulation differ markedly in the regulation of these devices. Delaware law generally 
gives more leeway for the target board to enter into deal protection devices. The U.K. 
regime is much more shareholder-centric and severely restricts most types of deal 
protections. This paper examines the differences and argues that the U.K. regime is the 
result of the strong influence of institutional share ownership. In contrast, in U.S., 
institutional share ownership is of more recent origin and market participants have 
instead pushed for greater board independence to counteract managerial self-interest.  
This paper also discusses the impact of recent trends, including changing shareholder 
ownership patterns and regulatory developments on the concepts of independence of 
outside directors and their impact on the substantive rules on deal protections. It 
concludes that while some modest changes to the substantive rules may be required, there 
is insufficient evidence to justify an overhaul of the rules in either jurisdiction.  
                                                 
*
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THE VALIDITY OF DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES IN  





In the United States (“U.S.”) and United Kingdom (“U.K.”), the strategy that is 
used to acquire a publicly traded corporation depends on whether the acquisition is a 
friendly or a hostile transaction. The majority of the corporate acquisitions are ultimately 
completed as friendly transactions, even though some of these transactions may originate 
as hostile or unsolicited transactions.1 In friendly transactions, the target board normally 
recommends the approval or acceptance of the transaction with the bidder to its 
shareholders. Shareholders will have a right to vote on the acquisition or merger 
transaction or to tender their shares in the bidder’s offer.  
  
A common feature of these friendly transactions is the presence of deal protection 
devices granted by the target to the preferred bidder. This paper focuses on two types of 
such devices, namely, the termination fees, pursuant to which the target agrees to pay a 
fee to the preferred bidder upon a specified event which occurs that prevents the 
                                                 
  
1
  In the years 2006 to 2008, approximately 3.8% and 4.9% of all announced M&A deals involving 
U.S. and U.K. target companies respectively are hostile or unsolicited. For the same period, approximately 
96.5% and 86.8% of all announced M&A deals involving U.S. and U.K. target companies respectively 
were friendly. See Table 1. Source: Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database.   
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transaction from being completed, and lockups, pursuant to which the target agrees to sell 
either newly issued stock or its assets to the bidder, in each case, at a favorable price on 
the occurrence of the same event as which has triggered the payment of the termination 
fee.  Empirical research shows that termination fees and/or lockups occur in an 
overwhelming majority of friendly transactions involving publicly traded companies.2  
 
This paper analyzes the use of deal protection devices in negotiated merger and 
acquisition (“M&A”) transactions in the U.S. and the U.K. involving target companies 
whose shares are publicly traded. U.K is chosen because like the U.S., most of its 
publicly traded companies have dispersed shareholdings and do not have controlling 
shareholders.3 In friendly transactions found in U.S. and U.K., even though the bidder 
and the target may have entered into a binding acquisition agreement, the completion of 
the agreement is conditional upon the approval of the target shareholders. Such approvals 
may take several months, depending on the deal’s complexity and regulatory approvals.4  
 
For a target with dispersed shareholdings,5 a bidder will often require the target to 
provide deal protection devices to deter subsequent bidders and to cover its expenses in 
the event that the transaction is not approved by target shareholders, either because there 
                                                 
2
  John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and 
Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 315 (2000) (reporting that in 1998, break fees were used in 70% of the 
friendly U.S. mergers greater than $50 million in value).  
3
  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around 
the World 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).  
4
  The average deal in the United States takes approximately five months to complete. See T.S. 
Walters, Alfred Yawson and Charles P.P. Yeung, The Role of Investment Banks in M&A Transactions: 
Fees and Services 16 PACIFIC BASIN FIN. J. 341, 353, tbl. 4 (2008) (showing the mean rates of completion 
for different classes of advisers to the target ranging from 110 to 139 days for U.S. transactions during the 
period 1980 to 2003).  
5
  Where the target has major or significant shareholders, the acquirer may also require these 
shareholders to give voting undertakings. Voting undertakings by shareholders are outside the scope of this 
paper, since this paper is concerned with deal protection devices entered into, or granted, by the target.  
 5 
is a competing bid at a higher price or because the offer price is below their expectation. 
A target may also grant a deal protection to a white knight bidder in response to hostile 
bids. The deal protection devices are normally entered into at the same time that the 
agreement for the merger or acquisition is signed though in certain cases, they may 
sometimes be entered into shortly after the signing of the agreement but before 
completion. Without controlling shareholders providing voting agreements in ensuring 
the success of the transaction, the presence of deal protections would occupy center stage 
in the negotiation of M&A agreements.6 Deal protection devices are intended to be 
binding on the parties without the target shareholders’ approval.   
 
Deal protections can be seen as the payment of an option fee for the target or its 
shareholders to consider the bid. However, they can be inimical to shareholder wealth 
maximization as they may allow disloyal target management to use deal protection 
devices to entrench themselves at the expense of shareholders. Deal protection devices 
are also preclusive, as they discourage higher bids from being made, and thereby 
reducing the disciplinary effects of takeovers, raising agency problems. The academic 
debate pivots around the value of deal protection from an economic analysis perspective: 
those opposed to deal protections have sought to demonstrate the negative effects on 
shareholder value.7 Those in favor have argued that they are value-enhancing as an 
                                                 
6
  Deal protections are usually less significant in companies with controlling shareholders and such 
controlling shareholders are willing to provide undertakings to vote for the acquisition in a particular 
manner. 
7
  E.g. Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996) (examining the effect of lockups on the market for corporate control and 
arguing that second-bidder lockups and anticipatory lockups should not be permitted because they do not 
encourage competitive bidding. Only non-anticipatory first-bidder lockups should be permitted because 
they enhance the market for corporate control and allocational efficiency by rewarding first bidders for 
search costs and informational externality a bid creates); Coates and Subramanian supra note 2 (arguing 
 6 
efficiency contracting mechanism in that they encourage bidders either to make initial 
bids or improve their bids.8  
 
U.S. and the U.K. law and regulation restrict the ability of the target board to 
enter into deal protection devices. However, even though both jurisdictions regard deal 
protection devices as defensive measures, both jurisdictions differ markedly in the degree 
and substance of the regulation. The law of Delaware, which is home to approximately 
50% of U.S. publicly traded companies,9 has applied at least three standards judicial 
scrutiny towards the regulation of deal protections, ranging from the application of the 
business judgment rule, the enhanced judicial scrutiny found in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co. (“Unocal”),10 and the auction duties found in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. (“Revlon”).11 Even under Revlon, which imposes the most 
exacting judicial scrutiny among the three standards, the fact remains that the directors 
are still given considerable leeway to have a significant say in entering into the deal 
                                                                                                                                                 
that existing theoretical models fail to take into account buy side distortions which may influence the 
behavior of the bidder’s managers and lockups should be scrutinized more carefully because these 
distortions provide the opportunity for lockups to affect the allocational efficiency in the market for 
corporate control.)  
8
  See e.g. Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate 
Takeover Auctions, 90 COLUM. L. REV.  682 (1990) (arguing that termination fees do not affect the 
outcome of bidder contests and would lead to the bidder and subsequent bidders bidding at close to their 
reservation prices less termination fee. However, a termination fee may preclude a higher valuing second 
bidder from bidding if the termination fee promised to the initial bidder is more than the difference between 
the initial bidder’s valuation of the target and the bid price and these are known as “foreclosing lockups”. 
However he argues that foreclosing lockups are very rare and most types of lockups should be permitted);  
Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739 (1994) (arguing that 
based on the Coarse Theorem, a termination fee will not deter a higher-valuing bidder from competing to 
acquire a target as long as the transaction costs for arranging a deal with the lower valuing bidder are not 
prohibitively higher); Brian J.M. Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 
865, 865-866 (2007) (arguing for a mandatory rule prohibiting sellers from providing buyers in non-Revlon 
transactions  with “bullet-proof” protection, and any protection should be limited to the extent necessary to 
compensate bidders for the transaction and opportunity costs of making bids).  
9
  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383 
(2003). 
10
  493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
11
  506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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protection devices. In contrast, U.K. adopts a shareholder-centric model by having a 
bright line rule regulating termination fees entered into by targets. Under the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeover Code”),12 termination fees and lockups are 
prohibited once they exceed a specified, pre-determined de minimis threshold of 1% of 
the target equity value. Target equity value refers to the equity value of the target 
company, on a fully diluted basis.13 Under U.K. company law, virtually all types of 
lockups are subject to shareholder vote, undermining the purpose of lockups as deal 
protections.  
 
This paper examines the reasons for the different approaches taken in the two 
jurisdictions. The first is the differing impact that institutional share ownership has had 
on U.S. and U.K. Institutional share ownership has long been higher in the U.K. than the 
U.S. and such ownership had a significant impact on the development of a self-regulatory 
takeover regime in the U.K which promotes strict shareholder choice. A strict shareholder 
choice regime restricts defensive measures (including deal protections) that can be 
unilaterally undertaken by the target management, 14 so as to encourage more bids by 
bidders or potential bidders. In contrast, institutional share ownership in U.S. is 
comparatively of more recent origin and U.S. federal regulation has precluded the 
possibility of self-regulation by the institutional shareholders. Instead, institutional 
                                                 
12
  THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (9th 
ed. 2009) (U.K.) [hereinafter TAKEOVER CODE].  
13
  TAKEOVER PANEL, PRACTICE STATEMENT NO. 23 of 2008, available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/ps23.pdf (last visited Jun. 1, 2009). The 
Takeover Panel also clarified that in calculating fully diluted basis of the equity value of the target 
company, only warrants and options which are in the money may be included in the calculation.  
14
  See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – 
The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007) (arguing, in the 
context of explaining why U.S. and U.K. have different substantive rules on defensive measures, that the 
mode of regulation matters).   
 8 
shareholders have pushed for boards of U.S. companies to be more independent in order 
to counteract managerial self-interest and to mitigate the agency problems.   
 
The second, albeit a partial explanation, is that a bidder faces higher wasted M&A 
transaction costs if the deal does not go through for a U.S. transaction than for a U.K. 
transaction. Hence a bidder for a U.S. target has a greater incentive for demanding higher 
termination fees. The higher costs arise from the differences in the process of takeover 
regulation; the U.S. regime relies on the courts as the primary arbiter to make decisions 
on disputes to the takeover process and given that Anglo-American judges are reluctant 
to intervene in commercial decisions made by boards, the resulting case law that develops 
gives considerable leeway to management to enter into deal protections. In contrast, U.K. 
relies on the U.K. Takeover Panel (“Panel”) as the final arbiter of disputes and the courts 
are not normally involved. Rulings are given speedily. The absence of prolonged 
litigation means that the takeover process is likely to be quicker and less expensive. 
Further, in terms of timing, a bid for a U.K. target is likely to complete within a shorter 
time frame than a bid for a U.S. target, which leads to costs savings. All these translate to 
the fact that all things being equal, the bidder’s anticipated wasted M&A transactional 
costs would be lower in bidding for a U.S. target than for a comparable U.K. target and it 
has more reasons to lobby for a higher termination fee or lockup as compensation.  
 
The recent developments on changing shareholder ownership patterns in publicly 
traded companies in U.S. and U.K. markets raise a couple of questions as to the likely 
directions in which the regulatory regimes in the two jurisdictions will move towards. 
 9 
First, given that U.S. institutional share ownership is becoming more concentrated and 
there are signs of more shareholder activism, would U.S. move towards a strict 
shareholder choice system? This paper argues that it is unlikely given the history of 
securities law and the fact that U.S. shareholders have not actually favored a strict 
shareholder choice model, even when they could have done so. Instead, they have 
preferred to push for more independent and effective boards to safeguard their interests. 
Second, what are the implications for U.K, takeover regulation if its institutional share 
ownership is becoming more fragmented due to U.K. domestic institutions selling down 
U.K. equities and foreigners buying in their place? This paper argues that the strict 
shareholder choice regime is so deeply entrenched that it is likely to continue.  
 
However, other trends may show that more modest changes to the substantive 
rules may need to be made. For example, the concept of independence and 
disinterestedness of outside directors in the takeover process may need to be reconsidered 
by the Delaware courts in view of the somewhat different concept of independence under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”).15 The ceiling on termination fees in U.K. may need to 
be reconsidered in light of the increasing use of change of control covenants in bond 
documentation. 
 
Finally, this paper considers the normative implication of whether either system is 
preferable. This paper argues that there is no clear evidence in this regard. The U.K. 
system promotes more hostile bids than the U.S. but there is no clear evidence that a rule 
whose effects lead to more hostile bids is necessarily more welfare enhancing. Neither is 
                                                 
15
  Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)). 
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it clear that the U.K. system will impose more externalities for other stakeholders (such 
as on employees) or will be less compatible with corporate social responsibility than the 
U.S. The empirical studies on termination fees and lockups are also equivocal.  
 
The analysis offered in this paper extends the prior scholarship in several ways. 
First, prior scholarship on deal protection devices is limited to a single country.16 The 
approach in this paper is explicitly comparative. Second, the available studies in the two 
jurisdictions have focused on differences on regulation of hostile takeovers.17 There is 
little comparative scholarship examining the issue on whether and why friendly deals 
selected by the target boards should be protected from third parties from a comparative 
perspective.18 This paper attempts to fill the lacunae. Third, this paper identifies specific 
recent trends, including the changing shareholder patterns in the two jurisdictions, the 
increasing use of change of control clauses and the increasing emphasis placed on 
corporate social responsibility issues and discusses their possible impact on the 
substantive rules on deal protections. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Part II explains the nature of deal protections 
that are used in the M&A scene and why termination fees and lockups differ from other 
                                                 
16
  E.g. Ayres, supra note 8; Fraidin and Hanson, supra note 8. 
17
  See Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast 
between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51 (1998) (examining the differences 
in the takeover regulation from the perspective of political choice). See also John Armour & David A. 
Skeel, Jr., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (examining the differences on hostile takeover 
regulation from the perspective of the regulatory mode in the two jurisdictions); Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, 
Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 157 (Reinier H. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW] 
(examining agency problems in change of control transactions in major representative jurisdictions 
including France, Germany, Japan, U.K. and U.S.).  
18
  C.f. Heath P. Tarbet, Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to Anglo-American Corporate 
Law, 34 LAW & POL’Y. INT’L. BUS. 627 (2003) (examining the use of termination fees in U.S. and U.K.). 
 11 
types of deal protections. Part III identifies the problems that exist in M&A transactions 
for publicly listed companies. Part IV analyzes the differences between U.S. and U.K. 
approaches. Part V examines the reasons for the differences, including the different 
impact of institutional share ownership in the two countries. Part VI draws the matters 
together, and discusses the trends and implications of the foregoing analyses. Part VII 
concludes. 
 
II. DEAL PROTECTIONS GENERALLY 
 
A. Termination Fees 
 
 A termination fee is an arrangement between a potential acquirer and target, under 
which a fee is payable to the potential acquirer if a specified event occurs which prevents 
the transaction from completing. Termination fees are intended to operate as an incentive 
on the target to ensure that the transaction goes ahead as the payment of the termination 
fees would have lowered the value of the target. 
 
While there is no exhaustive definition of the possible events, defined events 
typically include: (a) the target board withdraws its recommendation for the preferred 
bid; (b) the target shareholders vote down the merger or acquisition;19 or (c) the target’s 
recommendation or acceptance of a rival bid. At least in the U.K. context, termination 
fees are normally not expressed as payable upon breach of the target’s obligations, as 
                                                 
19
  These are also known as “naked” no-vote termination fees.  
 12 
they would otherwise potentially fall within the rule against penalties.20 In situations 
where the parties are of a similar size or have similar bargaining power, reciprocal 
termination fees are not uncommon. This paper focuses only on termination fees payable 
by the target.  
 
 Termination fees may be expressed as fixed as one lump sum (either a fixed 
amount or a percentage of the transaction value). In unusual cases, agreements to pay 
termination fees may be entered with more than one bidder.21 Tiered termination fees 
have also appeared in the market place. A tiered termination fee could be expressed as a 
fee payable upon the board’s rejection of the bid, and a further fee payable if the target 
completes a transaction with another bidder within the next two years. In the last five 
years, go-shop provisions have started to appear and the termination fees payable are 
expressed in bifurcated terms. For example, for a very limited period post-signing of the 
merger or acquisition agreement, the target may actively solicit alternative bids. The 
termination fee that is payable during the go-shop period is lower than that payable after 
the expiry of the go-shop period but before completion.22 
 
                                                 
20
  See e.g. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre v. New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] A.C. 79. 
21
  E.g. in 2003, there were two rivals bids for Debenhams plc.; both of the bidders were controlled 
two different private equity funds, Permira and CVC Capital /Texas Pacific Group. Debenhams entered 
into separate agreements to pay termination fees with each of the two private equity funds, but the 
maximum aggregate amount that was payable under all of the arrangements was not to exceed 1% of the 
equity value. Debenhams agreed to pay CVC/TPG inducement fees, even after recommending Permira’s 
bid, to encourage CVC/TPG to make a bid. See Debenhams The, FIN. TIMES, Sep. 13, 2003, at 16. 
22
  E.g. in Re Topps Co. Shareholders’ Litigation, 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007) (containing an 
agreement that if the target terminated the merger agreement to accept a superior proposal during the go-
shop period, the target had to pay $8 million fee plus $3.5 million in expenses (representing in total 3% of 
the deal value), and if the target terminated the agreement after the go-shop period, it had to pay $12 
million plus $4.6 million in expenses (representing in total 4.6% of the deal value)).  
 13 
The Takeover Code only allows the target to agree to a termination fee with a 
bidder which represents a maximum of 1% of the target equity value based on the offer 
price.23 The implication is that the out of pocket costs incurred by a bidder for a U.K. 
target would not normally exceed 1% of the equity value. 24 In contrast, termination fees 
in the U.S. are higher, which can be up to 6% of the deal value.25 The Delaware courts 
have allowed inducement fees of a magnitude of up to approximately 5% of the equity 
value.26 Also in many cases, merger agreements have separate clauses requiring 
compensation for the preferred bidder’s actual and documented costs, which are in 
addition to the termination fees.27  
 
B. Lockups 
                                                 
23
  The Takeover Panel has clarified that the target may enter into separate agreements to pay 
termination fees with two or more offerors, in each case up to 1% of the target equity value, even though 
the aggregate amount may exceed 1%. See TAKEOVER PANEL, PRACTICE STATEMENT NO. 23 OF 2008, 
supra note 13. 
24
  Infra note 165; see also Alan Gregory, Discussion of Termination Fees in Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Protecting Investors or Managers, 34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACC. 541 (2007) (discussing the likely 
out of pocket costs incurred in connection with a U.K. transaction and arguing that it is unlikely for such 
costs to exceed 1% of equity value save in exceptional circumstances such as the transaction complexity or 
the low value of the bid). The point by Alan Gregory may be illustrated in the bid by Morgan Stanley for 
Canary Wharf in 2003, where the termination fee was structured as follows: (1) £15.5 million, representing 
approximately 1% of the deal value, payable if independent directors withdraw or adversely modify the 
recommendation; and (2) £7.8 million, representing approximately 0.5% of the deal value, if the transaction 
is unsuccessful for any other reason. The lower figure in (2) suggests that the intention is to cover the 
bidder’s costs. See Jenny Davey, Morgan Stanley offered £7.8m fee if Canary bid fails, TIMES (LONDON), 
Dec. 6, 2003 at 54 and Canary Wharf Group plc, RECOMMENDED OFFER BY SILVESTER UK PROPERTIES 
LIMITED FOR CANARY WHARF GROUP PLC, Jan. 15, 2004, 26 (copy on file with author).  
25
  See Coates and Subramanian, supra note 2 at 346.  
26
  E.g. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp. 768 A.2d 492 (Del. 2000) (upholding fee of 3.5% of target 
equity value); Kysor Indust. Corp v. Margaux, Inc. 674 A.2d 889 (Del. 1996) (upholding a fee that was 
computed as high as 4.8% of the deal price); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. 787 A.2d. 691 (Del. Ch. 2001) 
(upholding termination fee of 3% and matching rights); In Re Toys “R” Us, Inc., Shareholder Litigation 
877 A.2d 975 (2005) (upholding termination fee that was 3.75% of equity value or 3.25% of transaction 
value). C.f. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 1999 WL 1054255 (Del Ch. 1999) 
(indicating that a termination fee of 6.3% certainly “seems to stretch the definition of the range of 
reasonableness and probably stretches the definition beyond its breaking point”).  
27
  E.g. In Re Toys “R” Us, id., (the fee was expressed as payable: (1) $247.5 million (representing 
3.75% of the equity value of the target) if the target terminated the agreement and signed up with another 
acquisition partner within a year; and (2) up to $30 million in documented expenses (representing 0.5% of 
the equity value of the target) if the shareholders vote down the proposal).  
 14 
  
Under a stock lockup, the target grants the bidder a stock option, which is 
normally exercisable in the event that the target decides to terminate the merger 
agreement to merge with a third party or where a person (other than the bidder) ends up 
holding a specified percentage of the target. An additional feature of a stock lockup 
includes allowing the holder to put the lockup to the target in exchange for cash 
payments.28 The stock lockup thus increases the cost of a potential second bidder which 
wishes to interlope. An asset lockup gives the bidder the opportunity to purchase 
specified assets of the potential merger partner at an attractive price if the deal breaks 
down. 29  It makes deal-jumping unprofitable for the deserting partner and causes other 
potential bidders to lose interest. 
 
In the U.S., typically the stock lockup for newly issued shares will not exceed 
20% of the target’s existing shares as many exchanges will require shareholder 
approval.30 Stock lockups granted by the target normally do not go so far as to permit the 
bidder to exercise the option prior to the shareholders’ meeting so as to vote those shares 
in favor of the transaction at such meeting.31 With the abolishment of pooling of interests 
                                                 
28
  Many of these stock lockups are capped, after Paramount v. QVC Paramount Communication Inc. 
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) where the Delaware Supreme Court criticized the use of the uncapped lockup.   
29
  It has been reported that asset lockups are virtually extinct by the late 1990s after Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). and Mills Acquisition v. MacMillan Inc 
559 A. 2d 1261 (Del 1989). See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 2, at 327.  
30
  The rules of the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and Nasdaq require 
shareholder approval for issuance of more than 20% of the corporation’s shares.  
31
  However, in the recent Bear Stearns/ JP Morgan Chase merger in 2008 which arose in the pending 
insolvency of Bear Stearns. In connection with JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns effected by 
way of a merger, JP Morgan acquired new shares in the target (issued by the board), amounting to 39.5% of 
its outstanding common stock after the issuance, in advance of the Bear Stearns’ shareholder vote and 
voted such shares at the meeting.  See Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Apr. 28, 2008, 1. See also Marcel Kahan and 
 15 
accounting treatment in 2001 in U.S., there is less incentive to undertake a stock lockup.32 
In comparison, asset and stock lockups are rarely used in the U.K. for the reasons set out 
in Part IV(A) below.  
 
C. Distinction between Termination Fees, Lockups and other Deal Protection 
Devices (“Embedded” versus “Pure” Deal Protections) 
 
Termination fees and lockups raise unique issues compared to other types of deal 
protections. Termination fees result in an immediate reduction in the value the target 
should the target not consummate the deal with the preferred bidder. Lockups have the 
tendency to do the same in the instances where the lockups have been granted to the 
preferred bidder at favorable prices. However, they also serve to compensate the bidder, 
to varying extents, if the target chooses not to consummate the deal. They are regarded as 
“embedded” deal protections for the purpose of this paper.33 
 
In contrast, other alternative deal protections, such as the exclusivity (in the form 
of no-shop or no-talk) and the mandatory recommendation provisions, do not reduce the 
value of the target. However, they are regarded to be even more pernicious in other ways. 
For instance, no-shop provisions typically prevent the target board from soliciting 
alternative bids once the merger or acquisition agreement is signed. No-talk provisions 
                                                                                                                                                 
Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware and the 
Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713 (2009).  
32
  Prior to June 2001, a stock option is used to destroy the pooling of interests accounting treatment 
for a competitive bidder. However, this accounting treatment ended in June 2001, and hence ending the 
incentive to use stock lockups. See Martin Lipton & Erica H. Steinberger,  Takeovers & Freezeouts, § 
5A.03[1], 5A.03[2] (2002). 
33
  The term is adapted from the term “embedded defenses”, that was first coined in Jennifer Arlen & 
Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 594 (2003). 
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are more severe than no-shop provisions, in that they prohibit the target board from 
entertaining requests for negotiation or information with alternative bidders. Severe no-
talk and no-shop provisions prevent the target from negotiating or even responding to 
requests for information alternative bidders, with the result that such offers may not even 
be brought to the shareholders of the target.34  
 
Mandatory recommendation provisions require the target board to put forth, and 
recommend, the deal with the bidder to the target shareholders. From the bidder’s 
perspective, exclusivity and mandatory recommendations are “pure” deal protections 
because they are adopted for the sole purpose of preventing the target company from 
consummating any other alternative deal. Both U.K. and Delaware law subject the “pure” 
deal protections of exclusivity and mandatory recommendations to the directors’ 
fiduciary obligations. In U.K., an agreement requiring the target board to recommend the 
preferred bid to the shareholders is subject to the implied term that such agreement ceases 
once there is a better offer and the directors are of the view that they are no longer able to 
bona fide recommend the offer.35 Similarly the Delaware courts have held that strict 
exclusivity provisions are pernicious36 and mandatory recommendation provisions violate 
the prohibition, which is derived under § 141(a) of the DGCL, against contractual 
                                                 
34
  One additional form of deal protection that is a hybrid between mandatory recommendation and 
exclusivity provision is the matching rights. A matching right operates as rights of first refusal; in the event 
that a subsequent bid is made, the initial bidder has the right to match the subsequent bidder’s bid by 
purchasing on the same terms as those offered by the subsequent bidder. Often a matching right is 
accompanied by a provision which prevents the target board from changing the recommendation if the 
bidder exercises its matching right. Matching rights serve as a disincentive for the subsequent bidder to 
make a bid because it could incur all the expenses of the bid, only to find that the initial bidder exercises its 
right of first refusal and walk away of the target. It is not clear if matching rights without a fiduciary out 
will survive judicial scrutiny. C.f. Toys “R” Us, Inc., Shareholder Litig. 877 A 2d 975, 1021 (Del Ch 2005), 
which had a termination fee combined with a right of first refusal, which was upheld. 
35
  Dawson International plc. v. Coats Patons plc. [1988] 4 B.C.C. 305.  
36
  ACE Ltd v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. 1999); Phelps Dodge Corporation v. Cyprus 
Amax Minerals Company, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, WL 1054255. 
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arrangements that fetter the board’s discretion.37 Accordingly, these provisions are 
subject to the fiduciary-out. The result of the fiduciary out is to enable targets to accept 
alternative competing bids or to compel the renegotiation of the price.  
 
However, the solution of subjecting exclusivity and mandatory recommendations 
to a fiduciary out does not work for termination fees and lockups. The whole purpose of 
termination fees and lockup agreements is that the bidder wants to be financially 
compensated if its deal is not consummated and to deter rival bids. Subjecting these deal 
protections to the fiduciary-out would render the deal protections nugatory.  
 
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH DEAL PROTECTIONS 
 
A. The Temporal Gap between Signing and Completion and Asymmetry between 
Bidder and Target Regarding Deal Certainty  
 
 Under the takeover law and regulation in U.K. and Delaware, once the bidder and 
target have entered into a binding merger or acquisition agreement or once the bidder has 
announced the offer, the merger or acquisition is always conditional upon target 
shareholder approval, either by shareholder vote or by the tendering of their shares. In a 
friendly transaction involving Delaware corporations, the transaction may be structured 
as a merger under § 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) or a 
                                                 
37
  Paramount Communication Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); CA, Inc. v. 
AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
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recommended tender offer followed by a freeze-out merger.38 For the former, the 
transaction requires the approval by a majority of the outstanding shares.39 For the latter, 
the offer is made by the bidder to the shareholders and the target board agrees to 
recommend to the shareholders that they tender their shares under the tender offer. The 
tender offer is required to be open for at least 20 business days.40 To achieve such 
approval either by shareholder vote or by tender, the requisite disclosures in the form of a 
proxy statement41 (for merger) or a tender offer statement42 must be prepared and filed 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). 
 
Similarly, in the case of U.K. companies, a friendly transaction can be structured 
as a scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 (“Companies 
Act”)43 or a recommended offer for the target shares. A scheme of arrangement requires 
the target board to propose the scheme to its shareholders and approval by a majority in 
number representing 75% in value of the shareholders, present and voting, either in 
person or by proxy, at the court-sanctioned meeting.44 For an offer for the target shares, 
the offer is required to be open for at least 21 days from the date the offer document is 
posted.45 A scheme document (for a scheme of arrangement)46 and an offer document (for 
                                                 
38
  It is also possible to purchase the assets of the target but this is not considered in this paper as it 
does not involve the acquisition of shares of target and the ownership structure of target remains the same 
post transaction. 
39
  DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 251.  
40
  17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2003). 
41
  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2003). 
42
  17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (2003). 
43
  Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (Eng.) [hereinafter COMPANIES ACT]. 
44
  Companies Act, § 899. 
45
  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 31.1. 
46
  Companies Act, § 897. 
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an offer) 47 must be dispatched to the shareholders under the Companies Act and the 
Takeover Code respectively.  
 
In contrast, even though the parties may agree otherwise, the acquirer is normally 
absolutely bound by the merger or acquisition agreement. The acquirer can only 
terminate the agreement only in exogenous circumstances.48  
 
 Faced with the prospect that a competing bidder may emerge after announcement 
but before completion, the bidder will want to reduce the risk of the target not completing 
the deal. The bidder would have incurred the costs of bidding, including the out of pocket 
costs (costs of negotiation, hiring the accountants, bankers and lawyers to conduct due 
diligence and banking financing costs) and other costs (including diversion from 
managing the business and the costs of exploring other merger or acquisition 
alternatives). Further, if the bidder is a publicly traded entity and has publicly disclosed 
the virtues of the merger, the bidder may suffer a fall in its stock value if the deal is 
pulled.   
 
The bidder has limited methods of protecting itself. It can require the target to 
agree to an exclusivity agreement. However, such an agreement is inevitably subject to a 
fiduciary-out, making it ineffective as a deal protection.49 Alternatively, the bidder can 
                                                 
47
  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 24.  
48
  In the U.K., there are severe limits on when the acquirer may lapse an offer once an offer is 
announced on grounds other than the non-fulfillment of the acceptance condition. It can only do so if the 
circumstances that give to the invocation of the condition are of material significance to the offeror in the 
context of the offer. See TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 13.4. 
49
  Supra Part II(C). 
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purchase target shares prior to making a bid. This is also known as toehold purchases. 
Functionally, they operate as stock lockups though the important difference is that a 
bidder can do so without the relevant target’s involvement.50 However, they are much 
more expensive than stock lockups.51 In addition, § 203 of the DGCL prohibits any 
business combination between the bidder and the target company  for a period of three 
years after the bidder passes the 15% threshold unless post-completion, unless the bidder 
receives board approval and two-third approval from the minority who remained after the 
takeover.52 Hence, if the bidder is not able to obtain approval of the target board post-
acquisition, the bidder will effectively need to wait out three years before it can exercise 
its ability to squeeze out minority ownership through a short form or long form merger. 
Also the requirement that public disclosure be made of holdings of significant stakes 
limits the opportunity to make inexpensive purchases. Section 13(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934 requires disclosure by 5% shareholders.53 Its equivalent U.K. 
counterpart is the requirement which requires the disclosure of shareholdings of 3% or 
more.54  
 
Further, in the U.K., toehold purchases run the additional complication that they 
impact the actual offer to be made by the bidder in many respects not found in a U.S. 
transaction. For example, share purchases affect the price at which the shares may be 
                                                 
50
  Coates and Subramanian, supra, note 2, 350.  
51
  Timothy R. Burch, Locking up Rival Bidders: The Use of Lockup Options in Corporate Mergers, 
60 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (2001).  
52
  DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 203. The prohibition does not apply if the takeover is approved by the 
board of the target before the bidder crosses 15% threshold or the bidder moves from below 15% to 85% in 
a single tender offer, excluding inside director shares. 
53
  15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).  
54
  FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FSA HANDBOOK, DISCLOSURE RULES AND TRANSPARENCY 
RULES, D.T.R. 5. 
 21 
acquired under the offer. Target shares held by the bidder generally cannot be voted at the 
scheme meetings if the takeover is implemented by means of a scheme of arrangement 
under the Companies Act.55 These shares will also not be counted towards achieving the 
compulsory acquisition threshold if the acquisition is effected by means of a general 
offer.56  
 
Thus, from the bidder’s perspective, the termination fee or the lockup is more 
effective in protecting its interests than other types of deal protections. Limiting the 
bidder’s ability to demand for a termination fee or lockup will reduce its willingness to 
make bids and if a bid is made, the bidder will offer a lower price than it would if a 
termination fee or lockup was available. 
   
B.  The Agency Problem  
 
 Where shareholdings are dispersed in a corporation, the agency problem becomes 
acute.57 From an economic perspective, when one person (the principal) depends upon 
another (the agent), an agency relationship arises. When agents engage in activities on 
behalf of their principals, they are tempted to put their own interests first, resulting in 
agency costs. Self-serving managerial conduct creates agency costs for shareholders. By 
liberally allowing deal protections, disloyal managers of a target may then be allowed to 
                                                 
55
  Re Hellenic & General Trust [1976] 1 W.L.R. 123 (Ch.D.); Re BTR plc [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 740. 
See Wai Y. Wan, Effecting Compulsory Acquisition via the Amalgamation Process [2007] Sing. J.L.S. 323, 
at 333-335. 
56
  Companies Act, §§ 974-975. 
57
  See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW , supra note 17 at 164. 
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grant termination fees or lockups to a favored bidder who has offered side deals to the 
managers. These side deals may include additional parachute provisions58 or management 
positions in the continuing merged entity. The shareholders of the target will not be able 
to take advantage of these benefits. This is part of a larger agency problem that exists 
between shareholders and the target management. There are some empirical studies to 
show that agency costs are significant in negotiated M&A transaction.59  
 
The agency problem is compounded by the fact that takeovers and mergers are 
“last period” transactions. In ordinary times, managers are incentivized by the firm’s 
policies on rewarding achievements through compensation and are disciplined through 
dismissal or demotion. Sean Griffith argues that the managers are ordinarily subject to 
constraints.60 When agents fear themselves to be in the last period of employment, these 
constraints imposed on the target management ceases; when the management has lost 
control, they no longer see the company’s products as being their responsibilities.  
 
Unlike certain types of defensive measures such as poison pills and selective 
payments to green-mailers,61 deal protections granted generally do not exist solely as 
                                                 
58
  Parachute provisions only apply to U.S. deals. In the U.K., Companies Act, §§ 216 to 219 require 
shareholder approval for payments made to directors by way of compensation for loss of office post-
takeover.   
59
  For instance, a study by Julie Wulf indicates that CEOs are willing to forego higher premia in 
exchange for better managerial position in the merged entity. See Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade 
Power for Premium? Evidence from ‘Mergers of Equals’, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60, 87 (2004). A study by 
Hartzell, Ofek & Yermack indicates that target CEOs accept lower premia in exchange of special personal 
treatments. See Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek and David Yermack, What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms are 
Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 57 (2004). 
60
  See Sean L. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1899 (2002). 
61
  Selective treatment to shareholders under a discriminatory self-tender of shares is no longer 
permissible: Rule 13e-4; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4. 
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defensive measures adopted for the sole purpose of deterring hostile bids but are often 
justified as serving legitimate business purposes, making it difficult to isolate the purpose 
for such measures being taken. A legitimate business purpose includes the fact that the 
initial bidder or the white knight bidder may not come forward with a bid unless he is 
granted a termination fee or a lockup. In addition, it could be argued that management 
has better insight on the company’s long-term outlook and growth. In order to credibly 
negotiate better deals, they would need to be able to offer termination fees and lockups.  
 
 Hence, despite the agency problem created by deal protections between 
shareholders and management, shareholders may be willing to live with deal protections 
as being necessary in any system of regulation that enhances competing bids. If deal 
protections are prohibited, initial bidders will be discouraged from making bids in the 
first place since the empirical evidence is that first bidders often lose out when 
competitors emerge.62 If initial bids are discouraged, then the disciplinary effect of 
takeovers will be reduced.  
 
IV. THE TWO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF REGULATION – COMPARISON AND EVALUATION 
 
A. U.K. Approach  
 
 U.K. takeover law and regulation is largely found in the Takeover Code, with the 
Companies Act, the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, and regulations 
                                                 
62
  Richard S. Ruback, Assessing competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions 11 J. FIN. 
ECON. 141 (1983). 
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promulgated under those legislation playing supplementary roles. The Takeover Code63 
first came into effect in 1968 as a response to the market abuses in the 1950s and 1960s.64 
When it was promulgated, the Takeover Code did not have the force of law. Instead, the 
Takeover Code was enforced by the Panel and was part of a self-regulatory system in 
which bodies that represent market participants appoint the members of the Panel. The 
Panel’s regulatory powers included the powers of administering, monitoring, compliance 
with and enforcing the detailed rules and principles in, and granting dispensations from, 
the Takeover Code. Enforcement was done through censures and the withholding of 
market facilities to the contravening persons.  
 
In 2004, the European Takeover Directive65 was adopted and the Government 
placed the Takeover Code on a statutory footing by enacting provisions to the effect in 
the Companies Act.66 However, the legislation did not fundamentally change the way that 
the Panel worked and maintained the advantages of a self-regulatory approach.67 
Currently, in addition to censure or taking action for the purpose of withdrawing facilities 
to contravening persons, the Panel may apply to the court to secure enforcement of the 
Takeover Code.68 The Panel also can report the offending conduct to regulatory bodies 
                                                 
63
  For a full account of the history and development of the TAKEOVER CODE, see Andrew Johnston, 
Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422 
(2007). 
64
  Infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
65
  European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L142) 12 (EC). 
66
  Companies Act, § 942. 
67
  See Jonathan Mukwiri, The Myth of Tactical Litigation in UK Takeovers, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 373 
(2008). 
68
  Takeovers Directives (Interim Implementation) Regulations 2006, Reg. 11. 
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with statutory powers such as the Financial Services Authority who can take the relevant 
enforcement action.69  
 
Strict Shareholder choice 
 
A fundamental objective of the Takeover Code is to ensure that shareholders have 
the right to determine the merits of the offer.70 Boards of target companies are prohibited 
from taking any action that would frustrate an offer or potential offer71 without the prior 
approval of shareholders.72 Even though the Takeover Code has been amended several 
times since its promulgation in 1968, this prohibition on frustrating actions by the target 
board has remained unchanged. The following rules illustrate the application of the basic 
prohibition for target managers to take any action that may frustrate a bona fide hostile 
bid in the absence of shareholder approval in the context of deal protections.  
 
First, deal protection devices with favored bidders are regarded as having effects 
that frustrate other potential offers. Under Rule 21.2 of the Takeover Code, termination 
fees (also known as inducement fees) are only allowed by the Panel if the following 
requirements are met: (a) the termination fee does not exceed 1% of the equity value of 
                                                 
69
  TAKEOVER CODE, Introduction, para. 11(b)(iv). 
70
  TAKEOVER CODE, General Principle 3, at B1 (providing that “[t]he board of an offeree company 
must act in the interests of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the 
opportunity to decide on the merits of the offer”). 
71
  TAKEOVER CODE, Introduction, para. 3(b) (providing that the TAKEOVER CODE applies to 
transactions for companies subject to the TAKEOVER CODE at whatever stage of their implementation, 
including possible transactions which have not yet been announced).  
72
  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 21. 
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the target, based on the offer price;73 and (b) the board of the target and its financial 
adviser confirm to the Panel in writing that they each believe the fee to be in the interests 
of the target shareholders.74 The Takeover Code expressly provides that it does not affect 
the analysis on the common law obligations owed by the directors to the target.75 
 
 Rule 21.2 is designed to eschew a formalistic effect; even contractual agreements 
providing for sums payable upon a breach of the merger agreement which prevent the 
offer from proceeding or causing the offer to fail will be subject to the 1% cap. Lockups 
which enable assets or shares to be purchased upon the preferred bidder’s offer failing are 
expressly caught within the prohibition under Rule 21.2 of the Takeover Code. 76  
 
A shareholder-centric view adopted by the Takeover Code does not mean that 
target directors are entirely passive in the takeover process; target directors are required 
                                                 
73
  TAKEOVER CODE, PRACTICE STATEMENT NO. 23 OF 2008 (indicating that the Panel would look at 
the substance of the termination fee; any fee that is payable which has similar or comparable financial 
impact as the termination fee will fall within Rule 21.2).  
74
  The other requirements include full disclosure of the termination fee and prior consultation with 
the Panel.   
75
  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 21 expressly provides that the views of the Panel only relate to the 
TAKEOVER CODE. 
76
  The example given in the TAKEOVER CODE was where Company A and Company B entered into a 
commercial joint venture which enabled Company B to acquire Company A’s interest in the joint venture 
at a discount in the event of a change of control of Company A; such a discount would be limited under 
Rule 21.2. This example is likely to be drawn from the merger transaction between P&O Princess and 
Royal Caribbean in 2002, where both P&O Princess and Royal Caribbean entered into a joint venture 
agreement contemporaneously with the implementation agreement to merge by way of a dual listed 
structure. Under the joint venture agreement, each party committed to contribute to US$500 million to the 
joint venture company, and upon change of control of either company, such company will be subject to put 
and call arrangements. This put and call arrangement will make it more costly indirectly for a potential 
bidder (Carnival) to acquire the shares in P&O Princess, as upon the completion of such an acquisition 
which would trigger the change in control of P&O Princess, P&O Princess will be subject to the put and 
call arrangements in relation to the joint venture agreement. The value of P&O Princess would 
correspondingly decrease by reason of the payment required to be made by P&O Princess under the put and 
call arrangements.  
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to state their views on the bid to the shareholders,77  which ensures that shareholders will 
have the information that they need in order to determine whether to accept the bid. In 
certain situations, the support of target directors is crucial. For example, if the bidder 
wishes to structure the merger or acquisition as a scheme of arrangement (as opposed to a 
takeover) because of the more favorable rules to achieve 100% control of the target, the 
target board support is essential as the board must put the transaction before the 
shareholders.78 This is the case even if the major or controlling shareholders wish to 
effect the transaction via a scheme of arrangement with the bidder but the transaction is 
opposed by the board.79  
 
The Takeover Code is only applicable where there is a bid or the possibility of a 
bid.80 However, other parts of U.K. company law and U.K. Listing Rules81 place 
restrictions on the board of a publicly traded company to undertake pre-bid defenses in 
the absence of a contemporaneous shareholder approval. The requirement of shareholder 
approvals under the Companies Act and the U.K. Listing Rules in a number of corporate 
actions (including share issuance) make it difficult for the target board to unilaterally 
implement defensive measures without shareholder sanctions. In effect, these rules make 
                                                 
77
  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 25.1. 
78
  If the bidder desires to obtain 100% control of the target, it can structure the takeover to be 
implemented by a scheme of arrangement (which requires approval by a majority of shareholders in 
number representing 75% in value of the shares) or a general offer followed by the compulsory acquisition 
process (which requires 90% of the shares being tendered into the offer).  
79
  In re Re Savoy Ltd. [1981] Ch. 351.  
80
  TAKEOVER CODE, Introduction, para 3(b). 
81
  FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FSA HANDBOOK: LISTING RULESS (U.K.), 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/LR [hereinafter U.K. LISTING RULES] 
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it more difficult for the target board to erect takeover defenses favoring the preferred 
bidder even in the absence of a bid. The following elaborates.82 
 
First, even if a stock lockup falls within the constraints of Rule 21.2 (that is, the 
value of the stock lockup is below the 1% target equity value cap), the Companies Act  
requires prior shareholder approval for the board to issue new shares or to grant option to 
subscribe for shares in the company.83 Existing shareholders of target also have rights of 
pre-emption in relation to the issuance for cash of equity securities or rights to subscribe 
for equity securities subject to limited exceptions.84 While the Companies Act enables 
directors to obtain advance approval from the shareholders to issue shares and have the 
pre-emption rights disapplied for periods, in each case, of up to five years,85 in practice, 
due to the influence of institutional shareholders, the directors will not be able to obtain 
the full approval permitted under the legislation. Instead, the directors will only obtain 
approval for issuance of not more than 5% of the issued share capital of the company in 
any one year for a non-routine rights issue and any such authority granted will have 
                                                 
82
  One further issue that has received some attention is whether break fees constitute prohibited 
financial assistance under the Companies Act, §§ 667, 668 and 680. Generally, under the aforementioned 
provisions, public companies are prohibited offering financial assistance to bidders for the acquisition of 
their own shares, unless an exception applies. Although it has been argued that termination fees and their 
functional equivalents may be regarded as providing financial assistance to the bidders to assist them 
indirectly in the acquisition of their own share, the better view is that break fees do not constitute financial 
assistance either because it is not “assistance” but merely an inducement fee, or a break fee is only payable 
if an acquisition, a necessary element of the offence does not occur. See Brigid Breslin and William 
Charnley, Break Fees: Financial Assistance and Directors’ Duties, 21 COMPANY LAWYER 296 (2000). 
83
  Companies Act, § 551.  
84
  Companies Act, § 561. Under the pre-emption rights, the issuance for cash for equity securities or 
rights to subscribe for equity securities must be offered first to the existing equity shareholders in 
proportion to the respective shareholdings, unless a special resolution to the contrary has been passed by 
shareholders in general meeting under § 571. An issue of shares or option grant in consideration for a 
reciprocal issue of shares or option should not constitute an issue for cash. 
85
  Companies Act 2006, § 571 read with §§ 561 and 551. 
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limited validity for not more than 15 months or until the next annual general meeting, 
whichever is the shorter period.86  
 
Second, apart from the above requirement for shareholders’ approval for any 
share issuance, the grant of a stock or asset lockup may require prior shareholder 
approval under Chapter 10 of the U.K. Listing Rules,87 depending on the size of the 
transaction and the consideration that is involved. In summary, in a transaction where any 
percentage ratio (based on gross assets, profits, consideration and gross capital tests) is 
25% or more, shareholder approval is required. The U.K. Listing Rules provide that a 
termination fee that exceeds 1% of the value of the publicly traded company calculated 
by reference to the offer price requires shareholder approval.88  
 
Third, the Companies Act places severe restrictions on the circumstances in which 
payments may be made to a director for loss of office (which includes the loss of 
employment) upon the takeover without shareholder approval.89 Such payments are 
regarded as either influencing the director’s recommendation or benefitting the director at 
the expense of the shareholders. No comparable restrictions are found under Delaware 
law.   
 
                                                 
86
  See infra note 141 and accompanying text.  
87
  U.K. LISTING RULES, Rule 10.1. 
88
  U.K. LISTING RULES, Rule 10.2.7.  
89
  Companies Act, § 217 read with § 215. Note, however, these restrictions do not cover payments 
made in discharge of existing legal obligations which are not entered into in connection with the takeover. 
Hence the vesting of employee options upon change of control will not be subject to such restrictions if 
these options are granted well in advance of the takeover.  
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In contrast to the Takeover Code, U.K. case law on fiduciary standards allows 
more scope for directors to adopt defensive measures. Unlike Delaware corporate law, 
the U.K. does not have the equivalent of the formal business judgment rule. Instead, the 
English courts have developed the doctrine that the actions of the management must be 
for a proper purpose. Under this doctrine, as exemplified in Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd.90 
and Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum,91 the court must determine the purpose for which 
management decision is undertaken. A decision of the board whose primary purpose is 
improper, such as to frustrate an unwelcome bid or ensuring their preferred bid is 
successful, is regarded as a breach of duty. However, dicta in the case law also suggests 
that if the board bona fide believes that the decision (even if it is a decision affecting the 
change of control) is in the interest of the company, the court will not intervene to 
substitute its decision for the board.92 
 
The proper purpose rule is now codified in s 171 of the Companies Act, which 
requires the directors of a company to exercise their powers for a proper purpose. It has 
not been decided by the English courts as to whether a company which enters into a deal 
                                                 
90
  [1967] 1 Ch. 254.  
91
  In a slightly different context, the court had to consider whether a poison pill taken by the directors 
is consistent with the proper purpose rule. In Criterion Properties Plc v. Stratford UK Properties LLC 
[2004] U.K.H.L. 28, the defendant, a joint venture partner, was given an option to be bought out upon 
favorable terms upon there being a change of control or the departure by certain senior management of the 
claimant. One year later, the senior management of the claimant left the company and the defendant sought 
to enforce the option agreement. It was argued that the option agreement was entered into to fend off an 
unwanted predator. At first instance, it was held that the option agreement was entered into by the directors 
of the claimant for an improper purpose. However, this point was not specifically decided by the Court of 
Appeal or the House of Lords. The Court of Appeal agreed on the abuse of power, but held on the narrower 
ground that the option agreement was much wider than fending off the predator; it could apply when there 
was a change of control or departure of certain officials and invalidated the option. The decision was 
reversed by the House of Lords on a different point, that is, it was not determined whether the claimant 
company had authority to enter into the option agreement.  
92
  E.g. Cayne and Munro Bank v. Global Natural Resources plc., per Sir Meggary VC, Ch. Aug. 12, 
1982 (unreported), aff’d [1984] 1 All E.R. 225. 
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protection device to ensure the success of a preferred bid is consistent with the proper 
purpose rule 93 and there is a dearth of case law in this area. The likely explanation of the 
absence of case law is that in relation to post-bid defenses, the position is subsumed 
under Rule 21 of the Takeover Code. Rule 21 does not focus on the purpose of the 
directors’ actions (which requires a fact intensive inquiry), but whether the consequences 
of such actions have the effect of frustrating a bona fide bid. Hence, the Takeover Code is 
a much more powerful tool in regulating post-bid conduct, and subsumes the 
development of the case law.  
 
B. U.S. (Delaware) Approach 
 
 U.S. takeovers are regulated at the federal level since 1930s by the enactment of 
the Securities Act of 1933,94 Securities Exchange Act of 193495 (as amended by the 
Williams Act96) and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder, and at the state level, state 
legislation and case law. U.S. law (specifically Delaware law) gives considerable leeway 
to the management of target companies to have a significant role in accepting or rejecting 
the offer. Decision making is effectively jointly in the hands of the board of directors and 
the shareholders; the board first determines whether the offer by the bidder shall proceed 
and the shareholders ultimately signify acceptance on the offer (whether by voting or by 
acceptance). It has been argued that this model allows the board to protect shareholders 
                                                 
93
  [2004] U.K.H.L. 28. 
94
  15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et. seq. 
95
  15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et. seq. 
96
  Williams Act, Pub L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000). 
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of the target against opportunistic behavior on the part of the acquirer. 97 In particular, 
deal protections allow the board to enhance their bargaining position and seek a better 
deal for the shareholders.  
 
While theoretically an unwelcome bidder may approach the shareholders directly 
through a tender offer (and bypassing the board), and at the same time launch a proxy 
solicitation to remove the incumbent management, it is much more disadvantageous for 
the bidder if the management does not support the particular offer (in the absence of bad 
faith). The directors of the target may utilize the poison pill or the shareholder rights plan, 
which dilutes the hostile bidder’s stake if the bidder acquires more than a specified 
percentage of the target stock. The presence of the staggered board makes it impossible to 
remove the majority of the board unless it extends over at least two annual election 
cycles.98  
 
Consistent with its approach towards allowing target management to have a 
significant say in who should be the ultimate acquirer or merger partner, Delaware law 
allows the use of termination fees and other lockups entered into by the target in more 
liberal circumstances than their U.K. counter-parts. The starting point under Delaware 
law is that decisions of the board are subject to the business judgment rule, that is, the 
directors are presumed to have exercised their decision with sound business judgment. 
Under the business judgment rule, the court will presume director independence, 
disinterestedness on the part of the directors, good faith and due care. The burden is on 
                                                 
97
  E.g. Davies and Hopt, supra note 17, 168-171. 
98
  Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subranmanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force 
of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN L REV. 887, 916 (2002).  
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the plaintiff to overturn these presumptions by showing breach of duties of loyalty and 
care. The court will not review the substantive merits of the decisions made by directors. 
However, in the context of deal protections, the courts have developed the following 
levels of scrutiny described below. 
 
1.  Defensive measure scrutiny 
 
Defensive measures which do not amount to change of control of target are 
subject to Unocal. Actions are regarded as defensive if they impact corporate control, as 
distinguished from standard corporate actions taken in connection with the ordinary 
course of business. In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc (“Omnicare”), the 
Delaware Supreme Court made it clear that deal protections were regarded as defensive 
measures.99  
  
In Unocal, in evaluating actions of the target board in response to the offer, the 
court held that the directors must demonstrate that: (a) the directors reasonably perceive a 
threat to the corporation and (b) their defensive measures are reasonable in relation to the 
threat posted by the hostile offer. Once the burden of proving (a) and (b) is satisfied, the 
actions of the directors qualify for the safe harbor of the business judgment rule. The 
burden then shifts back to the plaintiffs to show that directors’ decisions should otherwise 
be impugned on the ground of breach of duty, such as conflict of interest or the fact that 
                                                 
99
  818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). Another case which regarded deal protections as defensive is McMillan 
v. Intercargo Corp. 768 A.2d 492, 506 n. 62 (Del. Ch. 2000). See also Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. 
Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck: Determining the Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger or 
Equals Transactions 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2001).  
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the directors were motivated by bad faith.100 If the directors fail to establish the initial 
burden set out under the two limbs of Unocal, the defensive measure may still be upheld 
on the ground that the measure is intrinsically fair, but the burden of demonstrating the 
intrinsic fairness is on the directors.101  
 
Under the Unocal approach, the directors have considerable leeway on 
determining the size and type of the deal protections. The reasons are as follows. 
 
First, to satisfy limb (a), the threat by a rival bidder does not need to be 
structurally coercive (such as unequal treatment of all shareholders) but it is sufficient if 
there is substantive coercion (risk that shareholders mistakenly accept an under-priced 
offer because they disbelieve management’s presentations of intrinsic value). For 
instance, in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc. (“Paramount”),102 under the initial 
stock merger agreement between Time and Warner, Warner was to be merged into a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Time, with Warner being the surviving corporation. The 
common stock of Warner would be converted into the common stock of Time. As a 
“safety device”, there was a share exchange agreement, pursuant to which Time would 
receive 9.4% of Warner’s outstanding stock and Warner would receive 11.1% of Time’s 
outstanding stock and either party could trigger the exchange. The transaction required 
the approval of Time stockholders under the NYSE rules and the approval of the Warner 
stockholders under the DGCL. Prior to the Time shareholder vote, Paramount launched a 
$175 all cash, all shares tender offer for Time. In response, as a defensive measure, Time 
                                                 
100
  See Unocal, 493 A 2d 946, at 958 (Del. 1985). 
101
  Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid (1989) 559 A 2d 257. 
102
  Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc. A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) 
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and Warner restructured the initial merger agreement into a tender offer for 51% of 
Warner’s outstanding stock. The tender offer had a cash component of $70 per share and 
the remaining 49% would be purchased for a mix of cash and securities worth $70 per 
share. Paramount increased its offer to $200 per share. Time’s board rejected the 
Paramount offer as inadequate and argued that the merger with Warner offered a greater 
long-term value to Time shareholders, and that Paramount’s offer was a threat to 
shareholder value and corporate entity. The share exchange agreement was ultimately 
triggered. The Supreme Court of Delaware found that such an offer, even though was 
structurally non-coercive, could justify a defensive response. Paramount’s offer was 
found to present a threat, in that Time’s shareholders may tender to Paramount in 
ignorance or mistaken belief of the benefits presented by a merger with Warner. Also, 
Paramount’s offer was conditional, and hence uncertain, and was arguably timed to 
confuse and disturb Time’s shareholder vote on the merger with Warner.  
 
In addition, the directors’ proof of satisfaction of limb (a) in Unocal would be 
materially enhanced if the defensive measures (including deal protections) are approved 
by a “board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors”.103 In a subsequent 
case, outside independent directors are defined as directors who are neither employees 
nor management and the decisions are made based on corporate merits rather than 
“extraneous consideration or influences”.104 
 
                                                 
103
  See Unocal, 493 A 2d 946, at 955. 
104
  Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995).  
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Second, to satisfy limb (b), the court is placed in a regulatory role in deciding 
whether a particular defense tactic was reasonable in relation to the threat posted by the 
offer once a threat is demonstrated. However, it is not difficult for directors to satisfy the 
court that their deal protection measures constitute measures that are proportional to the 
threat. In Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,105 the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that defensive measures were upheld so long as they were neither coercive nor preclusive 
and were within the “range of reasonable responses”.106 A response is coercive if it is 
aimed at “‘cramming’ down on its shareholders a management-sponsored alternative” 
and a response is preclusive if it deprives stockholders of the right to receive all tender 
offers or precludes a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting proxy 
contests or otherwise.107  
 
The “range of reasonable responses” test formulated in Unitrin shows that the 
enhanced scrutiny is actually much closer to the business judgment rule.108 In the line of 
cases post-Unocal, directors are given considerable autonomy to enter into deal 
protections. In Paramount, the notion of shareholder primacy in takeover situations was 
not accepted by the Supreme Court of Delaware.109 The defensive actions of the Time 
                                                 
105
  Unitrin. 
106
  Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367. 
107
  Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387. 
108
  It has been argued that the effect of the rule is that there is very limited enhancement to the 
business judgment rule; see WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER R. KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, 
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2nd ed, 2007), 536.  
109
  The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the argument made by Paramount that Time’s response was 
unreasonable in precluding its shareholders from accepting the tender offer, holding that it was a 
“fundamental misunderstanding of where the power of corporate governance lies. Delaware law confers the 
management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected board representatives”, See 
Paramount 571 A 2d 1140, 1154. 
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board survived judicial scrutiny, notwithstanding the substantially more superior bid from 
Paramount. 
 
In Omnicare, the Delaware court held that the deal protections in question were 
coercive and preclusive. In that case, the controlling shareholders (holding over 65% of 
the shares) of  NCS agreed to vote in favor of the merger with Genesis and the board 
agreed to submit the merger to the shareholders, even if the board believed, at the time of 
the vote, the merger was not in the best interests of the shareholders.110 There was also a 
no-shop provision. A competing bid at a substantially higher bid price was made by 
Omnicare after the initial transaction was announced and the shareholders were not able 
to vote down the original deal with Genesis. The Delaware Supreme Court held, by a 
majority, that the deal protections were coercive and preclusive because they rendered the 
merger a fait accompli. The decision is unusual because the controlling shareholders had 
entered into the voting agreement and these shareholders (unlike the board) ordinarily did 
not owe any fiduciary duties to their fellow shareholders. The majority emphasized that 
deal protections continue to be evaluated under the Unocal standard of review, even in a 
stock for stock merger which would not trigger Revlon duties. The dissenting judgments 
stressed that the courts should not second guess the judgment of the board that has acted 
with due care or disregard the contractual intention of the majority shareholders. It is 
unclear whether and how Omnicare will affect termination fees and lockups. The better 
view, it is submitted, is that it is confined to force the vote clause (that is, the board 
cannot contract to give up its right to withdraw its recommendation or to withdraw the 
deal from shareholder vote) where the majority of the shares are subject to voting 
                                                 
110
  A force the vote provision was permitted under § 251(c) of the DGCL. 
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undertakings and does not stand for the more general proposition that all deal protections 
must be subject to a fiduciary-out.  
 
2.  Auction rules 
 
If defensive measure is adopted in any one of the following circumstances: (a) the 
target puts itself up for sale; (b) the break up of the target is inevitable;111 or (c) there is a 
change of control, Revlon rules will apply. Revlon does not apply if there is no change of 
control, such as a stock for stock merger that does not involve shift of control to one 
stockholder or affiliated group of stockholders.112 Once Revlon duties apply, the directors 
are required to get the highest value for the stockholders in the circumstances113 and 
maximize short-term value and the premise is that the transaction should be left 
unprotected so as not to preclude a higher-value bidder.  
 
If an auction is conducted, the case law demonstrates the court will allow 
significant board discretion in the manner in which the auction is conducted. 114  If two or 
more bidders are treated on unequal terms, the target board has to demonstrate that their 
actions can reasonably be said to have fostered the bidding contest or procured the 
highest available offer, even if such actions have foreclosed other bids.115 Accordingly, to 
                                                 
111
  Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., Del. Supr., 559 A.2d 1261 (1989), 1288.  
112
  A stock for stock merger can involve a change of control, such as that occurred in Paramount 
Communications v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). Cash mergers normally trigger Revlon 
duties unless there is already a majority shareholder in the target. See ALLEN, SUBRAMANIAN & 
KRAAKMAN, supra note 108, at 578. 
113
  See MacMillan where the court enjoined the lockup agreement in a case where Revlon applied. 
114
  MacMillan, 559 A.2d at  1286-1287. 
115
  Id. See also Paramount v. QVC 637 A.2d at 45 (the Court stating that the key features of the 
enhanced scrutiny test are (a) judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision-making process 
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justify granting a deal protection which is an auction-ending provision, it must confer a 
“substantial benefit upon the stockholders in order to withstand the exacting scrutiny by 
the courts”.116 Deal protections which are granted to a preferred bidder by a disinterested 
board of target which is adequately informed are more likely to be upheld.117  
 
The cases post-Revlon tended to focus on situations where there were competing 
bids. What if there is no bidding contest? One view is that a form of market test is 
necessary before Revlon duties can be said to be satisfied, which may take the form of 
holding an auction prior to the agreement.118 For example, in Re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 
Shareholders’ Litigation, the fact that there was a lengthy and detailed market check by 
the board prior to the grant of the termination fee amounting to 3.75% of the equity value 
was regarded as significant in coming to the conclusion that it should be upheld.119 In 
Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Company and others,120 the court refused to strike out the 
claim against the directors of a target founded on breach of loyalty on the ground that the 
target directors did nothing to check whether the bidder’s price was the best that could 
                                                                                                                                                 
employed by the directors, and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors’ action in 
light of circumstances then existing. The court would not substitute the business judgment for that of the 
directors but would determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance within a range of reasonableness). 
116
  MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1285. 
117
  E.g. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.Ch. 1989) (the President and 
CEO leading the buyout group did not select the board committee and members of the board committee had 
no financial interest in the bidder whose bid was endorsed by the board; even though the board eventually 
rejected a higher bid, the decision was protected under the business judgment rule). C.f. MacMillan, 559 
A.2d. at 1267 (in enjoining the extensive lockups granted in favor of the preferred bidder, the Delaware 
Supreme Court raised the questions on the independence of the special committee that was picked by 
Evans, who was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the target company, and of the committee’s 
financial adviser, which had worked with the management on a proposed management-led recapitalization 
even before the committee came into existence. Before the special committee was formed, the directors had 
considered various recapitalization proposals which would involve the management team controlling the 
majority of the company).  
118
  A recent innovation is the use of the go-shop clause, where the target is expressly permitted to 
shop for alternative bids for a limited period of time post-signing but prior to completion. Supra, n 22 and 
accompanying text. 
119
  877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
120
  2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105. 
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reasonably be obtained in the circumstances in a Revlon context. Accordingly, it is likely 
a market check conducted prior to granting deal protections devices will continue to be 
significant in the assessment of the validity of such devices.121  
 
 3. Other standards and further developments 
 
 The outline above on the standards of judicial review for M&A transactions is 
subject further to the following caveats. First, if the majority of the directors of the target 
stand on both sides of the transaction, the applicable standard of review is that of entire 
fairness under Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.122 Under the entire fairness analysis, the burden 
is on the board to show the transaction is entirely fair, in terms of procedure and price. A 
properly functioning special committee of independent directors is required to shift the 
burden to the person alleging unfairness.123 This situation is likely to be very rare it is 
unlikely for the directors of the target to stand on both sides of the transaction except in a 
parent-subsidiary merger. In such a case, deal protections will not arise since there is no 
sense in granting such protections by a subsidiary to its parent.  
 
Second, if the actions of the directors that are adopted are found to be primarily 
for the purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power, the directors would 
                                                 
121
  For commentary on the Revlon/ Unocal divide, see Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, 
Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521 (2002) at 554 
(drawing an analogy with the whale swallowing the minnow, where in such a case, the acquirer may be 
indifferent between paying in cash or securities but the creates the perverse incentive for the target board to 
ask for stock acquisition to avoid Revlon).  
122
  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d. 701 (Del. 1983). 
123
  Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).  
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be subject to the principles set out in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.124 In Blasius, 
it was held that a compelling justification must be found for its actions. While 
conceivably it could be argued that an exceptionally large termination fee or a lockup on 
unusually generous terms to the acquirer would effectively coerce the stockholders to 
vote for the merger, Blasius analysis has never been extended to termination fees or 
lockups.125 
 
Third, one particular development that should be highlighted is that increasingly, 
loan covenants entered into by companies contain change in control provisions which 
require the companies to pay back outstanding loans if there is a change of control or 
ownership.126 These are covenants which are granted by the companies to third parties 
but they have anti-takeover effects. It appears that the directors’ ability to enter into these 
covenants will be subject to the business judgment rule.127 With the tightening of credit 
post-financial crisis of 2008, acquirers looking to acquire target companies with change 
of control provisions have to ensure that not only do they have sufficient funds to pay for 
the acquisitions, they must have standby lines of credit if the target companies are forced 
to repay the debt. Standby lines of credit require a commitment fee payable to the banks, 
which will increase costs of doing takeovers. 
 
V. REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES 
 
                                                 
124
  Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
125
  An argument could be made that if the lockup confers voting power on the acquirer, as was the 
case in JPMorgan/Bear Stearns merger, Blasius could be implicated. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 31.  
126
  Ronald Grover, A Hot Weapon in Proxy Battles, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 20, 2009.  
127
  See discussion in Talley & Arlen, supra note 33. 
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A. Historical impact of institutional share ownership and shareholder activism  
 
U.K. and U.S. regard deal protections as defensive measures. However they differ 
markedly their respective approaches towards these defensive measures. The U.K. 
approach is shareholder-centric which regards termination fees and their functional 
equivalents as potentially adverse effects to target shareholders and safeguards are 
required. In contrast, U.S. law, in contrast, gives considerable leeway to the management 
of the company to put in deal protection devices to ensure that the preferred bid is not 
unraveled by a competing bid. The differences in approaches arise from the different 
historical impact that institutional share ownership has on takeover regulation in the two 
jurisdictions.  
 
 1.  United Kingdom 
 
This Part analyses the impact on institutional shareholder ownership on U.K. 
takeover regulation. The thesis is that institutional share ownership has significantly 
influenced the development of a self-regulatory takeover regime in the U.K., which 
ultimately led to a system which is based on shareholder choice.  
 
Historically, institutional share ownership has long been higher in the U.K. than 
the U.S. 128 In the U.S., institutional investors (defined as pension funds, insurance 
companies, banks and foundations) held 23% of all corporate equities in 1950, which 
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  For a much fuller account of the history in the shareholding patterns of U.K. companies, see 
BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2008) [hereinafter CHEFFINS), at chs 5 – 10. 
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increased to 53.3% in 1990129 and 66.3% in 2006. In the U.K., in the beginning of the 
19th century, shareholdings were mainly held by the founders and their families. As the 
capital needs of the companies grew, shares were offered for sale. Following the Second 
World War, blockholders began to exit and institutions began to buy. The holdings of 
U.K. institutions (pension funds, mutual funds, insurers, banks and other financial 
institutions) rose from 30.3% in 1963 to 60.5% in 1991.130 By the end of 2006, these 
holdings declined to 42.8% due to the fact that that U.K. pension funds and insurers 
began to sell down the equity holdings of U.K. companies and purchase international 
equities and bonds, and the foreign investors stepped up as the key purchasers.131  
 
Until the 1990s, U.K. institutional shareholders traditionally did not engage in 
company-specific activist activities.132 However, they were not entirely passive and 
through trade associations, they have significantly influenced the promulgation 
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  The statistics for 1950 and 1990 are found in Carolyn K. Brancato & Patrick A. Gaughan, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE (Sep 1991), cited in Mark R. Wingerson 
& Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner’s 
Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Theodor Baums et al. ed), 201, 
203. For statistics for 2008 are found in Press release, The Conference Board, U.S. Institutional Investors 
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board.org/utilities/pressdetail.cfm?press_id=3466 (last visited May 26, 2009).  
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  OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, SHARE OWNERSHIP: A REPORT OF OWNERSHIP ON UK SHARES 
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2006 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2007).  
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  Tony Cassell & Lina Saigol, International investors in the UK are buying up the keys to the 
Kingdom, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 22, 2005 (explaining that this is the result of pension funds and insurers buying 
international equities and bonds to diversify). See CHEFFINS, infra note 128, at 387 (explaining that the rise 
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the adoption of liability driven investing led to pension funds decreasing their investment in shares).  
132
  See CHEFFINS, supra note 128, at 375-381 
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development of the Takeover Code, which forms the bedrock of the takeover regime in 
U.K.  
 
The catalyst for the Takeover Code was the alarm raised over hostile takeovers in 
the 1950s.133 In 1959, at the initiation of the governor of the Bank of England, the Issuing 
Houses Association and the Accepting Houses Committee (the merchant banks), the 
Association of Investment Trusts, the British Insurance Association, the Committee of 
London Clearing Bankers and the London Stock Exchange came up with the 1959 Notes 
of Amalgamations of British Business. The 1959 Notes stipulated that a takeover offer 
should be for all of the shares of the company (thus ensuring equality of treatment to all 
shareholders). The revision to the Notes in 1963 addressed more broadly other aspects of 
the issue relating to the equality of treatment of shareholders. However, between the 
period 1961 to 1968, it was clear that the revised Notes were flouted in many 
instances.134  
 
In 1968, the Bank of England, the London Stock Exchange, leading issuing 
houses and major institutional investors sponsored the creation of the Takeover Panel, 
which had the responsibility for administering and enforcing the new body of rules 
referred to as the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. The 1968 Takeover Code 
reiterated the requirement of similar treatment of all the shareholders of the same class 
but introduced the most important principle that survives to the present day, that is, the 
board of a target company should not frustrate a bona fide offer without first seeking the 
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  See Johnston, supra note 63. 
134
  Dan D. Prentice, Takeover Bids – The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 18 MCGILL L.J. 385 
(1972). 
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approval of the shareholders and introduced the rule precluding the board of a target 
company from issuing shares, disposing assets or entering into major contracts without 
prior shareholder approval.135 The principle of no-frustration remained largely intact in 
the current version of the Takeover Code.  
 
In the late 1990s, after termination fees first began to make their appearance in the 
U.K. market in merger transactions involving U.S. and U.K. companies,136 the Panel 
issued a statement reiterating the importance that the interests of the target shareholders 
should not be adversely affected by inducement fee arrangements and there were 
concerns that a bona fide bid may be frustrated bid by reason of these arrangements.137 
The Panel regarded the amount of inducement fee that could be agreed by the target 
would normally mean no more than 1% of the offer value.  
 
 The situation that emerges is a regulatory framework which tightly controls post-
bid conduct by target management. However, even though pre-bid defenses are not 
subject to the Takeover Code, what is equally noteworthy is that U.K. companies hardly 
engage pre-bid defensive measures. In this respect, the situation is again explicable by the 
influence of the institutional shareholders. While U.K. institutional shareholders have 
been passive in relation to the companies in which they have holdings, the trade 
associations representing U.K. institutional investors nevertheless had a major influence 
                                                 
135
  THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS 1968, 
Principle 3, Rule 34, cited in CHEFFINS, supra n 128 at 369.  
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  George Graham, Outer Fortifications are Starting to Fall: Break fees; The U.K. has managed to 
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  THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, STATEMENT 10 OF 1999, INDUCEMENT FEES, available 
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on takeover regulation, often with the effect of seriously limiting the steps which target 
board can take as pre-bid defensive measures. The following examples illustrate. 
 
Institutional shareholders have always opposed the issuance of non-voting shares 
or weighted voting shares.138 Although there is no legislation or stock exchange rule 
prohibiting or restricting the issuance of non or weighted voting shares, U.K. publicly 
traded companies hardly issue classes of equity shares that carry different voting rights 
from the ordinary shares (apart from non-voting preference shares).139  
 
In addition, as explained in Part IV(A) above, if the company wishes to issue 
shares on a non-pro rata basis, the Companies Act requires directors to have received 
authorization for not only the issuance of shares but also the disapplication of the pre-
emption rights. Institutional shareholders have insisted that the rules on disapplication of 
such rights should be more restrictive that the Companies Act allows. While the 
legislation allows for the disapplication of the pre-emption rights for up to five years so 
long as the requisite shareholder approval is obtained,140 the non-binding Statement of 
Principles, which is drawn up by the Pre-emption Group that has institutional shareholder 
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  WEINBERG AND BLANK ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (William Underhill ed., 5th ed. 1989 & 
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support,141 provides that institutional shareholders will normally support routine 
disapplications only when the company in question undertakes to limit any non-rights 
issue to 5% of the issued share capital of the company in any one year, and restrict the 
discount to 5% of the market price. These pre-emption guidelines are put in place to 
protect institutional shareholders against dilution but they limited significantly the ability 
of the board to undertake pre-bid defensive measures that involve or potentially involve 
the issuance of shares. 
 
In the area for corporate control, the resulting system in the U.K. is one of a 
shareholder-centric model, in which trade associations representing institutional 
shareholders had significant influence in developing. Post-bid, termination fees (and their 
functional equivalents) are viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on 
shareholder choice. Pre-bid, institutional shareholders have ensured that target 
management does not have the ability to erect strong takeover defenses in anticipation of 
defending against other bids. 
 
2. United States 
 
In 1932, Berle and Means wrote their classic study of shareholding patterns of 
large U.S. corporations;142 they analyzed the paradigm U.S. corporation as being one that 
                                                 
141
  PRE-EMPTION GROUP, DISAPPLYING PRE-EMPTION RIGHTS: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, July 
2008, available on http://www.pre-
emptiongroup.org.uk/documents/pdf/Statement%20of%20Principles%20July%202008.pdf . These 
Guidelines were adopted initially in 1987. The Pre-emption Group is supported by the Association of 
British Insurers, the National Association of Pension Funds and the Investment Management Association.  
142
  ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(New Brunswick 1991) (1932).  
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had strong managers and widely dispersed shareholders and professional managers 
control large corporations. Scholars have given various explanations on the shareholding 
pattern. In particular, Mark Roe has explained that over-regulation in the U.S. federal 
regulation during and before the 1930s has led to the impediment in the scale, scope and 
power of financial institutions in the U.S., thereby deterring them from taking a close 
interest in the activities of corporate executives and undermining their ability to 
coordinate with one another.143 Absent such constraints, a very different result could 
occur, similar to Germany and Japan, where financial institutions play an active 
monitoring role.  
 
However, the shareholding patterns in the U.S. have not remained static. Since the 
1980s, there has been a concentration in publicly traded companies in the hands of 
institutional investors. U.S. pension funds have steadily increased to be become the 
largest block of institutional shareholders, with 32.6% and 38.3% of total assets under 
management in 1980 and 2006 respectively.144 Within the pension fund group, state and 
local funds held 11% of all institutional assets or 28.7% of all total pension fund assets in 
2006.145  
 
At the same time, institutional investors have begun to play a more active role in 
corporate governance. Between 1987 and 1994, it was reported that public pension funds 
                                                 
143
  MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994), ch.1  
144
  CAROLYN K. BRANCATO AND STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE 2008 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 
REPORT: TRENDS IN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ASSETS AND EQUITY OWNERSHIP OF US CORPORATIONS 
(2009), 4. 
145
  Id. 
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sponsored 463 proxy proposals seeking changes in the corporate governance.146 During 
this period, institutional shareholders submitted proposals related to anti-takeover devices 
such as the repealing of poison pills and submitting poison pills to shareholder votes, and 
proposals for structural changes, including proposals relating to the voting of board 
members, declassifying boards of companies with classified boards and having 
independent boards and board committees.  In 1992, the SEC passed new proxy rules147 
which made it easier for shareholders to communicate with one another and coordinate 
their actions in proxy solicitations.148  
 
Most of these shareholder resolutions controlling the boards’ use of the pills were 
either not successful or were only precatory in nature. 149 However the resolutions have a 
more positive impact in relation to board composition. Shareholders resolutions on 
declassifying boards have garnered more shareholder votes and by the 1990s, companies 
which did not have classified boards generally would not succeed in gathering enough 
votes to amend their charters to adopt classified boards.150 Throughout the 1990s and the 
early years of 2000s prior to the introduction of SOX, the trend showed that the number 
of U.S. companies whose boards comprised a majority of independent directors 
                                                 
146
  Stuart L. Gillian and Laura T. Stark, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: 
the Role of Institutional Investors 57 J. Fin. Econ. 275 (2000) citing data from Investor Responsibility 
Research Center, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN, 1991-1994.  
147
  Regulation of Communication Among Shareholders, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release 
no. 31,326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48, 276 (Oct. 16, 1992).  
148
  After these rules were promulgated, it was reported that institutional shareholders rely less on 
proxy proposals (which is more expensive) and more on direct negotiation with management: see Gillian 
and Stark, supra note 146, at 279. 
149
  Marcel Kahan & Edward B Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive 
Responses to Takeover Law 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002), 885-886. 
150
  Kahan & Rock, id.  at 885-886. 
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increased.151  In 2002, the amendments to the NYSE and Nasdaq listing rules (arising 
from SOX) required the boards of listed corporations to comprise a majority of 
independent directors.152 A study of 1,500 S&P companies showed that companies whose 
boards were at least two-thirds independent was 85% as at 2008.153  
 
Why is there a movement towards more independent boards?154 There is evidence 
that boards with independent directors are more likely to dismiss an underperforming 
CEO and less willing to endorse an overpriced bid (from the acquirer’s perspective).155 In 
the takeover context, outside directors of target boards are less likely to agree with the 
CEO’s assessment on whether to do the merger or acquisition with the particular acquirer 
without actively scrutinizing the merits of the deal, including questioning the existence of 
any management self-interest. They can stop a misguided merger or acquisition even 
before the termination fee or lockup signed. In other words, increasing the number of 
outside directors can mitigate the potential agency problems.  
 
Thus the situation in the U.S. has evolved in the form of market participants 
pushing for the boards of corporations to become more independent in order to counteract 
managerial self-interest. In order to incentivize outside directors to do their job properly, 
                                                 
151
  James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter & Tina Yang, The Determinants of Board Structure 87 J. FIN. 
ECON. 308 (2008) (showing, in Panel B, the trend of insider-dominated boards which has fallen since 1990, 
with the trend most pronounced for small and medium firms.)  
152
  “Independence” of a director is defined in detail in NYSE, Inc., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 
303A (2002)  and in Nasdaq, Inc. LISTED RULES, Rule 5605. 
153
  Riskmetrics Group, Board Practices: Trends in Board Structure at S&P 1,500 Companies, 
December 17, 2008. 
154
  Kahan and Rock, supra note 149 (calling the market participants’ embrace of more independent 
boards as “adaptive devices”), at 872. 
155
  Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence 39 
UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992).  
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since the 1980s, outside directors of U.S. publicly traded companies are increasingly 
being paid stock or stock options as compensation for their services.156 The aim is to 
directly align the interests of directors and shareholders, incentivize the outside directors 
to maximize takeover returns.157 Although the Enron and Worldcom saga show that 
equity-based compensation is not, in itself, the perfect answer to self-interested behavior 
of executives, it is at least a partial solution to the agency problem.  The number of U.S. 
companies keeping the roles of the chairman of the board separate from the CEO has 
increased significantly.158 Not allowing an individual to hold the position of chairman 
and CEO is regarded as improving governance as it avoids concentrating too much power 
in the hands of the individual.   
 
The development towards enhancing board independence is also consistent with 
Delaware case law. Special emphasis has always been given to the role of disinterested 
outside directors in the takeover process under Delaware law. In 1981, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware held that where it is alleged that the acquirer stands on both sides of 
the transaction, the burden of proof shifts to the party alleging unfairness if the decision is 
made by a committee of independent directors.159 In wave of takeovers in the 1980s, 
corporations form special committees of outside directors to assess the merits of the 
                                                 
156
  David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 59 J. 
FIN. 2281 (2004) (estimating the personal financial gains of more than 700 directors appointed by Fortune 
500 firms between 1994 and 1996). 
157
  Infra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the possible negative impact of equity 
compensation). 
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  Riskmetrics Group, supra note 153 (pointing out that as at June 2008, 46% of the S&P 1,500 
companies had separate individuals serving as chairman and CEO, an increase of 21 percentage points 
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  Weinberger, supra note 122 
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proposed transactions.160 For defensive measures (which would include taking deal 
protection measures with favored bidders to lockup the transaction), the approval of such 
measures by outside independent and disinterested directors substantially enhance the 
directors’ proof that the directors had reasonable grounds for believing that the bidders 
acted in a manner that posed a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness.161 
 
In contrast, in the U.K., the Takeover Code strongly emphasizes on the rights of 
the shareholders to determine the merits of the offer.162 The board of the target has to 
give its opinion on the merits of the offer and if a director faces a conflict of interest, he is 
required to abstain from joining the other directors in giving the opinion.163  The 
Takeover Code does not otherwise deal with the role of outside directors, even though the 
role of independent directors in corporate governance practice has been highlighted in the 
corporate law landscape since 1992.164  
 
B. Incentives for Bidder 
 
                                                 
160
  See William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy? 
45 BUS. LAW. 2055 (1989) (assessing the efficacy of the special committees of boards in the sale 
process). 
161
  Supra, n 104 and accompanying text.  
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  TAKEOVER CODE, General Principle 2. 
163
  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 25.1, Note 3. 
164
  The corporate governance codes originated with REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL 
ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Dec 1992) (being a report from the Cadbury Committee) 
[hereinafter known as the CADBURY COMMITTEE REPORT], and it was subsequently followed by 
DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION, REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP (Gee, 1995) (being a report from the Greenbury 
Committee) and FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Gee, 1997) (being a 
report from the Hampel Committee). The current COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
[hereinafter COMBINED CODE] requires non-executives are to make up at least half of the board. While 
compliance with the COMBINED CODE is voluntary, the U.K. DISCLOSURE RULES AND TRANSPARENCY 
RULES (Rule 7.2) require companies to disclose how they have complied with the Combined Code or if 
they have not done so to explain the reasons for the departure.  
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In addition to the different underlying principles in takeover regulation explained 
in Part V(A) above, the bidder which is bidding for a U.S. target has greater incentives to 
secure a larger termination fee than if it is bidding for a U.K. target. Out of pocket 
expenses of the bidder, in the form of legal and other due diligence costs and financing 
fees, in a typical U.K. transaction are unlikely to exceed 1%, save in unusual 
circumstances.165 Even assuming that these out of pocket expenses in both jurisdictions 
are similar, it could be argued that a bidder making a bid for a publicly listed target in 
U.S. may incur greater fees than if it had made a bid for a comparable U.K. target for the 
following reasons.   
 
First, relation to the manner in which disputes are resolved, in the U.S., the resort 
to litigation as a means to adjudicate disputes is frequently used. 166 Even though the deal 
between the preferred bidder and target is initially friendly, it may be subject to challenge 
by the target shareholders (on behalf of the target) the ground that the deal protection is 
too onerous or otherwise violates fiduciary duties. The bidder will be a party to the 
litigation because it is enjoined from completing the transaction. Once challenges to the 
transactions are made by way of litigation, costs in terms of significant management time 
and legal fees need to be expended.  
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  It has been suggested that based on the estimated legal and due diligence costs (between £0.5 
million to £2 million and loan financing of 0.5% to 1%, a fee above 1% of the deal value could hardly be 
justified by actual costs incurred by the bidder, unless the deal is relatively small or is complex. See Alan 
Gregory, Discussion of Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: Protecting Investors or Managers, 
34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 567 (2007).  
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  A study of U.S. transactions on the ThomsonOne database of transactions between 1990 to 2005 
show that litigation occurs in 33.9% of the all the hostile transactions. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined. at 1748 (Table 2 showing the number of hostile transactions that are 
litigated.) 
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In contrast, the market participants in takeover process in the U.K. rely on the 
Takeover Panel to give rulings speedily. Lawyers may but need not be involved.167 The 
courts are not as involved for a number of reasons. U.K. procedural rules do not 
encourage target shareholders from bringing of shareholder suits on behalf of the 
company against the directors in the courts.  Under the proper plaintiff rule, the wrong is 
done to the company and the decision to bring a lawsuit is regarded as a management 
decision of the company, and only the board of the company may bring such a suit. A 
derivative action against the company may only in brought in exceptional circumstances. 
At common law, the shareholder needs to show “fraud in the minority”, which requires 
inter alia, the showing that there is wrongdoer control.168 Neither do the newly enacted 
derivative action rules under the Companies Act169 encourage the bringing of lawsuits. If 
the derivative action is successful, the company (and not the shareholders) keeps the 
gains. However, if the defendant loses, he ends up paying the winner’s costs. Further, 
contingency fees are disallowed. While conditional fee arrangements are permitted, the 
maximum upside for lawyers participating in such agreement is limited to 100% of their 
hourly charged –out rates.  
 
Second, until recently, U.K. transactions are typically structured as takeover 
offers which are typically completed in short time periods, thereby reducing the risks 
faced by the bidders.170 The Takeover Code specifies the time period for which a 
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  TAKEOVER CODE, Introduction, para. 7(c) provides that “Although not usual, parties may, if they 
so wish, be presented by legal advisers.” 
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  Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] Ch. 204. 
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  Companies Act, Part 11 (ss 260-269).  
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  However, it should also be noted that there are signs that there is a trend for U.K. transactions to 
effect friendly transaction by way of a scheme of arrangement (rather than an offer), to take into account 
the more favorable rules for achieving 100% control. See THE TAKEOVER PANEL, ANNUAL REPORT 2007-
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takeover offer must be open and when it has to be completed.171 The objective of a tightly 
regulated timetable is to minimize uncertainty and disruption brought by a bid.172 If a 
competitive situation arises, such as there being more than one bid for the target, 
revisions to offers must be made in published in accordance with an auction procedure 
determined by the Panel.173  In contrast, again until recently, a U.S. M&A transaction 
effected by way of a merger takes much longer to complete.174 If it is structured as a 
tender offer in the U.S., there is a minimum offer period of 20 business days175 but it can 
be extended indefinitely. Until the recent amendment to the SEC rules in 2006,176 tender 
offers were hardly used to effect friendly transactions because of the uncertainties in 
whether the “best price rule” applies to employee arrangements. A longer completion 
time has direct costs implications. If it is an equity offer and the bidder needs to incur 
underwriting fees, such fees will be dependent upon the length of time in respect of 
which the underwriting commitment lasts. An inflation of underwriting costs will result if 
                                                                                                                                                 
08, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/report2008.pdf (last 
visited Jun. 1, 09) (reporting that in the year ended Mar. 31, 02, 10% of the takeovers regulated by the 
Panel were effected by way of scheme of arrangement and in the year ended Mar. 31, 08, the figure rose to 
41%. See also Practical Law Company, Deal Analysis: Analysis of Schemes of Arrangement Used to Effect 
Takeovers, data available as at May 31, 09, available at http://www.practicallaw.com/4-217-0003 (last 
visited Jun. 1, 09) (reporting that for deals with a value of £250 million, in 2007, 28 were structured were 
announced or subsequently structured as schemes of arrangement and 6 were offers; between January to 
November 2008, these figures were 14 and 8 respectively). 
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  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 31.6 (the offer may not be open for acceptances beyond 60th day after the 
initial offer document is posted unless the offer is unconditional as to acceptances, and all conditions must 
be satisfied within 21 days. The offer document should normally be posted within 28 days of the 
announcement of the firm intention to make an offer under TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 30.1. Note, however, 
that Rule 31.6 will not apply to an offer which is structured as a scheme of arrangement. The rationale for 
not applying the same rules on timing to a scheme of arrangement was that the scheme of arrangement 
required court sanction and it may not be possible to align the court time-table with the offer timetable. See 
THE TAKEOVER PANEL, STATEMENT BY THE CODE COMMITTEE OF THE PANEL FOLLOWING EXTERNAL 
CONSULTATION PROCESS ON PCP 2007/01, RS 2007/1 (Nov. 29, 2007) 
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  WEINBERG AND BLANK, supra note 138, § 4-4039. 
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  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 32.5. 
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  See Walters et. al., supra note 4 (survey shows that the average time to complete the U.S. deal is 
about 5 months). 
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  Supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
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  17 C.F.R. Parts 200 and 240, Release No 34-54684 (Nov. 1, 2006).   
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the bid completion is delayed. A longer completion period means that the parties may 
have to do the planning and integration prior to completion, which will be wasted if the 
transaction is not completed.  
 
The different processes of takeover regulation may provide a partial explanation 
of why a bidder in a U.S. transaction may be subject to higher bid costs (which will be 
wasted if the transaction is not completed) and hence have incentives to request for 
higher termination fee. However, the direct out of pocket costs are unlikely, in 
themselves, account for the substantially higher termination fees seen in U.S. 
transaction.177 The bidder in U.S. transaction also wants to protect itself from other costs, 
including indirect costs, such as loss of management time in reviewing the bid to the 
exclusion of other possible M&A transactions. If the bidder is publicly listed, it may 
suffer reputation harm (especially if it has outlined the business reasons for acquiring the 
target and such acquisition has failed). The difficult is distinguishing termination fees and 
lockups that compensate the bidder for direct and indirect costs and those which deter 
other bidders due to self-interested management.  
 
VI. TRENDS, IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS  
 
A.  Changing Shareholder Ownership Patterns  
 
                                                 
177
  Micah S. Officer, Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions 69 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (2003). 
(drawing attention to the ‘punitive’ element of U.S. break fees). In one U.S. transaction, in U.S., a 
termination fee of 2% of the target’s market capitalization was regarded as a reasonable estimate of the bid 
costs and other opportunity costs associated with the termination: see Brazen v. Bell Atlantic 695 A.2d 43 
(1997). 
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 1. United States 
 
The analysis on the shareholding patterns in U.K. and U.S. raises the question as 
to whether the increasing concentration in institutional ownership in U.S. companies may 
result in the U.S. moving towards the U.K. model of takeover regulation that is based on 
shareholder choice. While U.K. has long had a level of institutional ownership that 
exceeds the U.S. levels, the U.S. levels of institutional ownership have increased rapidly 
since 1950. It has been thought that the U.K. experience with the rise of institutional 
ownership may be relevant to future changes and trends within U.S. corporate 
environment.178 In principle, concentration of institutional shareholding should reduce the 
problem of free-riding effects of dispersed shareholding, and bring about shareholder 
pressure on management. The U.K. examples have shown that collectively, professional 
bodies representing the institutional investors may be influential in making takeover and 
corporate governance changes.  
 
Commentators have argued that the rise in institutional shareholding and 
institutional activism can potentially be an effective constraint on agency costs in the 
corporation.179 Since institutions hold larger blocks than individuals, they have the 
incentives to develop expertise in the making and monitoring of investments. While 
funds could simply sell their holdings in under-performing companies, the holdings are 
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  E.g. see John. C. Coffee, Jr. Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, Ch 11, European Takeovers Law and Practice (ed. by Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch) 
(1992).  
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  Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Voice 39 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 811 (1991). 
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so large that the shares may not be sold without causing the prices to fall and suffering 
further losses. They also have greater access to information.  
 
However, it is unlikely that the rising institutional share ownership in the U.S. 
equity markets will shift Delaware takeover regulation to a regime based on shareholder 
choice for the following reasons.  
 
First, John Armour and David Skeel have argued that the U.K. shareholder centric 
is a product of a self-regulatory regime which is heavily influenced by trade associations 
representing institutional shareholders.180 The Takeover Code was drafted with the 
involvement of institutional shareholders. Dispute resolutions are resolved by the 
Takeover Panel which is appointed by market participants. All these ensure that the 
system is one of a pro-shareholder approach which maximizes shareholder returns. In 
contrast, U.S. federal regulation, namely the securities regulation in the 1930s, has pre-
empted the possibility of self-regulation as mandatory oversight was by Congress and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The most significant aspects of takeover 
regulation is Delaware judge-made law and there is a structural bias for judicial decisions 
to be pro-managerial.181  
 
Second, more crucially, the evidence does not suggest that U.S. shareholders 
favor takeover regimes based on U.K.-style strict shareholder choice. Despite the rise in 
institutional share ownership since 1990s, investors have not constrained the board in 
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  Armour & Skeel, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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  Id., at § III(C). 
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rejecting poison pills. In a study of charter provisions of over 300 IPOs between 1994 and 
1997, more than half of the companies explicitly include a takeover provision and 60% of 
the companies established a staggered board or make it difficult for shareholders to 
replace the board between annual meetings.182  Even though companies could 
theoretically “opt out” of Delaware’s approach in their charter provisions by requiring all 
potentially frustrating actions by the board to require shareholder approval, companies 
have not done so. Even companies that are going public for the first time have not 
included such provisions. 183  All these give support to the views that U.S. shareholders 
may prefer to use other devices to constrain shareholder power, such as requiring more 
independent directors on the boards of the companies.  
 
Third, the trend that emerges is that of institutional shareholders seeking more 
effective independent boards and this trend is likely to continue. For the activist hedge 
funds, it has been reported that they are pushing for structural or organizational changes, 
rather than traditional activist demands like selling divisions, buying back stock and 
issuing large dividends.184 The SEC recently revisited the issue relating to director 
nomination, proposing amendments to the rules which make it easier for shareholders to 
nominate up to 25% of the company’s board of directors.185 It appears that the direction 
taken in U.S. is to continue to allow for target board autonomy, but decisions will be 
taken by more independent boards. Institutional shareholder monitoring efforts will be 
                                                 
182
  Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover 
Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001). 
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  See Kahan and Rock, supra note 149, at 894-895. 
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  Zachery Kouwe, Among Activist Investors, a New Hesitancy, NY TIMES, Mar 26, 2009, p F6.  
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  Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders 
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indirect and effected through the boards of directors. This development is likely to occur 
even in the area of corporate control.  
 
2. United Kingdom 
 
In the U.K. the institutional shareholders are mostly fiduciary institutional 
investors, that is, fund managers and other institutions which control shares on behalf of 
others, normally pension fund trustees, pensioners and other savers.186 Pension funds and 
insurance companies collectively held 9% in 1957, which increased to 33% in 1975 and 
51% in 1991.187 However, the composition of institutional shareholding in the U.K. has 
changed significantly. Since 2000, U.K. pension funds and insurance companies have 
reduced their holdings in equities. In 2006, their combined holdings were at 27% of the 
total equity and instead, the shareholdings of foreign holders have increased to 40% as at 
2006.  
 
Historically, U.K. institutional investors did not engage in company-specific 
shareholder activism. In the 1990s, there were instances in company-specific shareholder 
activism, 188 particularly in relation to issues on executive pay189 though a review in 2001 
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  COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE 
ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT (London: DTI, 2001), para 6.20. 
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  See CHEFFINS, supra note 128, at 86-93. 
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  Brian Cheffins explained that the increase in shareholder activism was the result of, inter alia, 
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demonstrated that the levels of engagement with management of investee companies 
were still low.190 The increasing fragmentation among the institutional shareholders may 
make it more difficult for the major U.K. pension funds, insurers and fund managers to 
coordinate and mount a challenge to management decisions.  
 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the recent 2008 financial crisis, questions have been 
raised as to the effectiveness of institutional shareholder monitoring on corporate 
managers, especially in areas of risk management for banks. Clearly the institutional 
shareholders’ preferred method of effecting changes via behind the scenes consultations 
had not been a success.191 In the first half of 2009, there is documented a much higher 
incidence of shareholders (including foreign institutional investors) voting on 
remuneration matters of U.K. companies.192 In response to the financial crisis, the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee193 has issued a paper, outlining ways to increase 
engagement with management.194 In a market downturn, it is clear that is more optimal to 
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call the management into account by the exercise of voice rather than by exit via selling 
the shares of their under-performing portfolio companies.  
 
In spite of the changes in the composition of shareholders of U.K. companies, it is 
unlikely that the Takeover Code’s pro-shareholder orientation will change, given the 
current financial crisis. At the recent implementation of the EU Takeover Directive, the 
U.K. was not obliged to maintain the prohibition on defensive measures; it could adopt 
the option where defensive measures are not prohibited unless the shareholders of the 
companies choose to opt into adopting the prohibition. However, the Government clearly 
intended that the prohibition on defensive measures would continue to apply, which 
illustrates the entrenchment of the pro-shareholder choice stance in U.K.195  
 
B. Concepts of independence and disinterestedness  
 
In the line Delaware cases decided after Unocal and Revlon, defensive measures 
(including deal protections) made by truly disinterested directors are given more weight 
and the courts will give deference to such board decisions, whether such measures are 
evaluated under the Unocal or Revlon standard of review.196 The case law has 
                                                                                                                                                 
committees to stand for election each year and if any individual director has less than 75% of the votes, the 
chairman of the board will have to stand for re-election the following year). 
 
195
  The U.K. Government stated that “important UK City and business stakeholders emphasized their 
support for article 9 [of the Takeovers Directive] and the principles underlying it”. See DEPARTMENT OF 
TRADE AND INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAW IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON TAKEOVER 
BIDS: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (2005), at 26-27. Article 9 of the Takeovers Directive provides, inter 
alia, that boards of offeree company (or target company) must obtain the prior authorization of its 
shareholders for taking any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result in the frustration 
of the bid.    
196
  Supra note 117 (discussing Macmillan). 
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emphasized that disinterestedness must mean free from managerial domination197 and 
free from financial interest that is adverse to the corporation.198 One question that arises 
is whether directors who have significant stock ownership or who are representatives of 
significant shareholders would disqualify them from being truly disinterested in takeover 
contests. Would the holding of stock mean that these directors are more likely to make 
decisions with the shareholders’ best interests or with their own financial interests? This 
issue is becoming more important because of the trend in compensating outside directors 
in the form of stock and stock options199 and also in view of the recent proposal to allow 
institutional shareholders to nominate directors on the board.  
 
It has been argued that § 301 of SOX, 200  taken together with the listing rules 
which are adopted post-SOX, appear to imply that ownership or affiliation with the 
owner of a significant block of company stock would cast doubt on a director’s 
independence. 201 However, the cases decided prior to the enactment of the SOX have 
taken the view that significant ownership of shares by outside directors not only does not 
qualify a director’s independence but is in fact regarded as beneficial as such ownership 
                                                 
197
  Id.  
198
  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
199
  Supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
200
  Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)) requires, inter alia, 
that the audit committee of a listed company must comprise entirely of independent directors and such a 
person may not be an affiliated person of the company or its subsidiary.  The SEC rules provides a safe 
harbor for shareholding under 10 percent but it also means that a director who owns or is affiliated with a 
stockholder who owns 10 per cent. or more of the company’s shares may be regarded an affiliated person 
and would not be able to serve on the audit committee: see Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit 
Committees, Exchange Act (as added by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301) Release No 33-8820, 34-
47654 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003), at II(a)(3).   
201
  See William B. Chandler III and Leo E. Strine Jr., The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State 14 (New 
York University Center for Law and Business, Working Paper No. CLB 03-01; University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-03, Feb. 26, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=367720  (last visited Jun. 1, 2009) (discussing the 
attitude towards equity ownership by independent directors under the statutes and listing rules).  
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aligns the interests of the directors with the shareholders.202 While there is no direct 
conflict as SOX determines independence for the purpose of audit committee only and 
case law determines disinterestedness for purpose of determining the validity of 
defensive measure in question, there appears to be a shift in current thinking that 
significant ownership or affiliation with significant shareholders may qualify a person’s 
independence or disinterestedness. In particular, if equity compensation constitutes a 
significant proportion of an outside director’s net wealth, it could compromise her 
opportunity costs of leaving the board.203 For example, an outside director may decline to 
challenge a CEO’s decision to merge with another party if she is promised a board seat in 
the merged entity, to ensure that her flow of compensation is not compromised.  
 
It is an open question whether the Delaware courts will reconsider the concept of 
independence or disinterestedness in light of these developments in determining whether 
deference should be given to board decisions.204  
 
C. Change of Control Clauses 
 
 Will the 1% equity value ceiling on termination fees and their equivalents in U.K. 
continue to be appropriate? It is suggested that this ceiling should be reconsidered in light 
                                                 
202
  E.g. Unitrin supra note 104 at 1380-1381 (the Delaware Supreme Court rejecting the argument 
that Unitrin’s outside directors, who are also substantial stockholders, would not vote like other 
stockholders in a proxy contest, i.e. in their own best economic interests, and holding that stockholders are 
presumed to act in their own best economic interests when they vote in a proxy contest).  
203
  See Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors 105 Mich. L.R. 1677 
(2007) (arguing that equity compensation of outside directors has limitations).  
204
  In the U.K., shareholding of a non-executive director (that is, a director who is not in management 
or represents management) that represents a significant portion of his wealth is regarded as undesirable: see 
See DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (2003), 
para.12.26.  
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of the fact that the amount may under-compensate the bidder even in respect of out of 
pocket deal costs. As pointed out in Part IV(B)(3)  above, the increasing use of change of 
control covenants put in place in bond and loan documentation in companies means that 
the bidder has to make arrangements for credit lines to repay such debts and refinance 
such loans at higher rates. Companies which have been identified as having change of 
control covenants in their bond or loan agreements include companies not only in the 
U.S. but also in the U.K.205 
 
 Accordingly, a more appropriate reference point is the transaction value (rather 
than the equity value), which will be the total amount that the acquirer needs to pay 
(either in cash or in kind) in order to acquire the target. This would take into account the 
bidder having to re-finance the debt of the target upon the successful completion of the 
takeover. Otherwise a system which puts the 1% cap on equity value under-compensates 
the acquirer in certain circumstances. The sensitivity shown to the difference between 
equity and enterprise value is reflected in the Delaware case law. For example, in Toys 
“R” Us, the court drew the distinction between the equity value and the transaction value, 
which was the total debt and equity that the private equity buyer needed to pay in order to 
acquire the target.206 
 
D. Which method is preferable?  
 
 1. Promotion of hostile versus friendly bids 
                                                 
205
  For U.K. companies, see Paul J. Davies, Moody’s Warns on Change of Control Clauses, FIN. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007.  
206
  Toys R “Us”, 877 A.2d 975 at 997. 
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If hostile bids are to be encouraged either because the mere threat of hostile bids 
serve as a disciplinary effect on managers and/or such bids encourage the acquired assets 
to be utilized more efficiently, it could be argued that deal protections should be more 
tightly regulated. Termination fees and lockups make the hostile bids more difficult to 
succeed (due to the diminution in target value) and they prevent the would-be hostile 
bidder from even making a bid. One important effect of the pro-shareholder takeover 
regulation in U.K. is that its target companies attract much more hostile bids than U.S., 
even after adjusting for the respective seizes of the two economies.207 Even though the 
Takeover Code has some aspects which make it more expensive (and less flexible) for a 
bidder such as the rules on mandatory bid208 and for a bidder to ensure that equality of 
treatment of all shareholders of the same class,209 overall, its restrictions on deal 
commitments with preferred bidders and its overall ban on defensive tactics make it 
easier for hostile takeover bids to be launched and succeed.  
 
Historically, hostile bids play an important role in corporate law as they are seen 
as serving as a disciplinary effect on the managers; in contrast, friendly mergers are seen 
as synergistic. 210 Promoting hostile bids is in a way similar to promoting auctions, where 
the goal of the target management is to get the highest price for the shares. The 
arguments in favor for having a rule that favors hostile bids or auctions is that there is no 
                                                 
207
  See Armour & Skeel, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 1741. 
208
  TAKEOVER CODE, Rule 9. 
209
  TAKEOVER CODE, General Principle 1. 
210
  See e.g. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Characteristics of Targets of 
Hostile and Friendly Takeovers, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach 
ed., 1988) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES] 101, 104-26 (showing the 
empirical evidence that hostile takeovers are disciplinary and friendly takeovers are synergistic). 
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other perfect substitute for takeovers in order to prevent the management from acting in a 
self-interested manner. Shareholders’ derivative actions have their own limitations211 and 
post-Enron and Worldcom era, remuneration of management that is reliant on 
performance based compensation actually led to perverse effects.  
 
However, it is not possible from the evidence to conclude that a rule whose 
effects lead to more hostile bids or more auctions is necessarily more welfare enhancing 
than a rule which leads to more friendly bids for the following reasons. First, the 
distinction between friendly and hostile bids is not so clear-cut. Academic commentators 
have argued that it could be a matter of negotiating strategies for a bidder.212 A bid may 
initially be rejected by the target board for inadequacies in the price but the target board 
eventually changes its mind when the bidder raises the price.  
 
Second, the evidence does not demonstrate convincingly that hostile bids are 
overall more welfare enhancing than friendly bids. While hostile bids have been shown to 
be positively correlated to takeover premium realized by target shareholders, the evidence 
is not clear whether such resources are in fact re-distributed to the target shareholders at 
the expense of acquirer shareholders in the long term.213  
 
                                                 
211
  For a discussion on the demerits of derivative action, see Arad Reisberg, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), at 47-50 (including derivative actions are 
costly, they generate other agency costs and they deter legitimate risk-taking). 
212
  See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder, 55 J. FIN. 2599 
(2002). 
213
  E.g., see Christian Tuch & Noel O’Sullivan, The Impact of Acquisitions on Firm Performance, 9 
INT’L J. MGT. REV. 141 (2007) at 152-155(reviewing the empirical research on the correlation between 
mood of takeover (whether hostile or friendly) on performance and finding that the research suggests 
hostile takeovers improve firm profitability and shareholders in single hostile bidders fare best but there is 
no identification of significant positive returns for bidders). 
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2. Costs of strict shareholder choice model  
 
 One of the arguments for a managerial primacy model is that blanket prohibition 
on defensive measures creates externalities for the other stakeholder groups, especially 
employees. Shleifer and Summers have argued that companies have implicit long-term 
contracts with employees, 214 including rewarding the employees well if they do their jobs 
well and are productive. These contracts are not legally binding because the expectations 
are too undefined to be given legal protection; however, such contracts are beneficial to 
both the employers and employees. If a target company is acquired, the new management 
has no moral obligation to honor these implicit contracts (even if the acquisition is 
undertaken other than for management under-performance) and has no qualms in 
breaching the implicit contracts upon the successful takeover by either cutting or 
reducing their above-market wages, being the deferred portion of their remuneration. 
Once employees become afraid of the consequences of takeovers, they will become 
reluctant to invest in firm specific human capital, such as the acquisition of specialized 
skills, which will reflect in lower output levels. The result is that these takeovers are 
merely rent-seeking and not value-creating exercises; any increase in performance is a 
result of the transfer of wealth from stakeholders to employees. Yet, the new 
management has every incentive to breach the implicit contracts in order to realize 
immediate cash-flow which appears to be attractive, at the expense of longer-term gains.  
 
                                                 
214
  Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 210, ch. 2.  
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 An implication of the argument is that directors can and should take into account 
stakeholders’ interests as part and parcel of considering the long-term interests of the 
company (even if they do not serve the short-term interests of the company). 
Accordingly, by this argument, target management should have the discretion to be able 
to put up takeover defenses that will ensure that the implicit contracts would not 
ultimately be breached post-acquisition. These defenses may include the entry into deal 
protections with a favored bidder which has promised not to breach the implicit contracts.  
 
Another issue that arises is the importance of encouraging business strategies that 
will build long-term shareholder value and be compatible with corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”).215 In Paramount, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that 
directors may consider the impact of constituencies, other than shareholders.216 In the 
1980s, many states in U.S. (though not including Delaware) enacted stakeholder 
constituency statutes.217 Most of these statues permit directors to consider the interests of 
the other constituencies when making decisions.218 While the pursuit of such strategies 
may not directly translate to financial performance, they are seen as essential as building 
long-term value. On the face of it, a regime which encourages hostile takeovers 
encourages managers to engage in short-termism and is not conducive to strategies that 
build stakeholder relations over a longer term. Conversely, a regime which allows target 
board managerial discretion allows them to take into account on the interests of other 
                                                 
215
  E.g. HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2008), available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file50312.pdf (last visited Jun. 2, 2009). 
216
  Paramount 571 A.2d at 1153. 
217
  E.g. Pennsylvania enacted the first constituency statute in 1983 which permits the directors to 
consider non-shareholder interests in discharging their duties; see 15 PA. Const. Stat. § 1716(a). 
218
  Id.  
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stakeholder groups in deciding whether to go ahead with a particular transaction with the 
bidder. 
 
The empirical evidence on the effect of M&A transactions on wages and 
productivity levels in both U.K. and U.S. firms do not unequivocally suggest that 
takeover offers result in target shareholders are receiving value at the expense of 
employees. There is a study which shows that in the U.K., takeovers of British firms by 
U.S. acquirers has actually increased the wages of skilled and unskilled employees of 
these firms post-acquisition, though the issue as to whether such acquisitions are 
desirable would depend on the reasons are for the higher wages.219 Another study shows 
that there is no support for the Shleifer and Summers’ hypothesis, but rather workers and 
employees are locked into ‘equal misery’ resulting from the poor performance of the 
merged entity.220 Other recent empirical studies involving leveraged buy-outs of British 
firms suggest results that are more consistent with the analysis by Shleifer and 
Summers.221 The data on U.S. firms is also inconclusive; there is a study on 
manufacturing plans which show that wages and employment increase after ownership 
                                                 
219
  Sourafel Girma & Holger Gorg Evaluating the foreign ownership wage premium using a 
difference-in-differences matching approach, 72 J. INT’L ECON. 97 (2007). 
220
  Til Beckmann and William Forbes, An Examination of Takeovers, Job Loss and the Wage Decline 
within UK Industry, 10 EURO. FIN. MGT. 141 (2004). 
221
  See Kevin Arness & Mike Wright, The Wage and Employment Implications of Leveraged Buyouts 
in the UK, 14 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 179 (2007) (review of transactions over 1999 to 2004 on leveraged 
buyouts cases; for leveraged buyouts, the cases are divided into management buyins (“MBI”) , where the 
new management team is recruited from outside the firm, and management buyouts, where the existing 
local management team assumes control; study suggests that the newcomers are more likely to breach 
implicit contracts of employments because MBIs display lower employment and wage growth. See also 
Aoife Hanley and Vasilios Zervos, The Performance of UK Takeovers: Does the Nationality of Acquirers 
Matter? 14 INT’L J. ECON. & BUS. 283 (2007) (research showing that there is dip in productivity 
immediately upon the conclusion of a takeover based on a study of 755 UK firms between 1990 to 1996, 
irrespective of whether the acquirer is U.K., US or from other jurisdictions.) 
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change.222 However, another study reports declines in levels of employment and wages of 
non-production workers at manufacturing buy-outs.223  
 
There is insufficient evidence to conclude whether either regime is better 
positioned to address CSR matters. The constituency statutes enacted in the 1980s are 
seen as the results of managers successfully lobbying to insulate themselves from the 
effects of takeovers, rather than attempts to protect employees and other stakeholders.224 
Also these constituency statutes do not go as far as allowing the stakeholders to enforce 
the duties imposed thereunder.225 The empirical studies on the effect of these statutes on  
shareholder wealth is mixed.226 A recent study shows a positive co-relation between anti-
takeover devices and socially responsible actions.227  
 
However, U.K. has more stringent requirements on mandatory disclosures by 
companies on CSR matters than U.S. 228  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, U.K. 
                                                 
222
  Robert H. McGuckin & Sang V. Nguyen, The impact of ownership change: a view from the labor 
markets 19 INT’L. J. OF INDUS. ORG. 739 (2001).   
223
  Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The effect of ownership changes on the employment and 
wages of central office and other personnel 33 J.L. & ECON. 383 (1990).  
224
  See e.g. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987). 
225
  These statutes do not grant employees standing to sue to enforce the duties imposed. See Mark G 
Robilotti, Recent Development: Codetermination, Stakeholder Rights, and Hostile Takeovers: A 
Reevaluation of the Evidence from Abroad 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 636 (1997). 
226
  See Note, Sword or Shield: The Impact of Third Generation State Takeover Statutes on 
Shareholder Wealth 57 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 958 (1989) (finding that state takeover statute has a 
negative effect on shareholder wealth); c.f. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes 73 Va. 
L.R. 111 (1987) (finding that takeover statute has no adverse effect on shareholder wealth).  
227
  A recent empirical study in U.S. shows that firms with anti-takeover devices direct their attention 
to institutional stakeholders, such as the community and natural environment, and experience higher long-
term shareholder value. It would suggest that when relieved from takeover threats, managers can undertake 
more socially responsible actions but the study acknowledges that there could be other explanations for the 
findings. See Aleksandra Kacpercyzyk, With Greater Power Comes Greater Responsibility? Takeover 
Protection and Corporate Attention to Stakeholders 30 STRAT. MGMT. J. 261 (2009). 
228
  See Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the 
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct 38 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 493 (2005) (discussing the 
mandated disclosures of social and environmental risks in U.S. and U.K.) 
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considered the link between takeover regulation and corporate governance as part of the 
wider corporate law reform and decided that instead of adopting a pluralistic, stakeholder 
model, it adopted an “enlightened” shareholder value concept. Accordingly, the newly 
enacted § 172 of the Companies Act229 requires the directors to consider the interests of 
groups beyond shareholders, including employees’ interests, when they exercise their 
decision-making powers in promoting the success of the company “for the benefit of its 
members as a whole”. Presumably, since the Takeover Code was not amended as a 
consequence of the enactment § 172, the intention of the regulators is that in a takeover 
bid, the interests of the other stakeholders are to be considered only insofar as they serve 
the interests of the present shareholders (rather than future shareholders).230 At the same 
time, the Companies Act mandates a business review disclosure of, inter alia, 
information about environmental matters, employees and social and community issues.231 
Such disclosure addresses the need for the market to be apprised of companies’ CSR 
activities and enable shareholders and other stakeholders in making judgments on non-
financial performance.232  
 
                                                 
229
  For a discussion of s 172 of the U.K. Companies Act 2006, see Joan Loughrey, Andrew Keay and 
Luca Cerioni, Legal Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Shaping of Corporate 
Governance 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 79 (2008). 
230
  Some support is found in THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY 
LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (London, DTI, Feb. 1999) U.R.N. 99/654 at 47-48. See also Johnston, 
supra note 63 (pointing out that it was regrettable that there was no further consideration as to the takeover 
reform after the Government’s withdrawal of the Operating and Financial Review, infra note 232).  
231
  U.K. Companies Act 2006, § 417.  
232
  The original recommendation of the Company Law Review Steering Committee was for an 
Operating and Financial Review [hereinafter OFR] and regulations to that effect were promulgated. The 
OFR was to provide a check on the more inclusive directors’ duties to promote the success of the company, 
taking into account other stakeholders’ interests. However the OFR was abruptly withdrawn by the U.K. 
Government and replaced with a business review: see GOWER AND DAVIES, at 737-741. See also John 
Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konselmann, Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK 
Corporate Governance 41 BRITISH J. OF IND. RELATIONS 531 (2003) (arguing the importance of non-
financial aspects of corporate performance to the market).  
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Given the conflicting empirical studies, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether 
the gains to shareholders outweigh the costs incurred by the employees when the implicit 
contracts are breached post-takeovers. Assessing the issue of whether takeovers impose 
other costs on social, environmental and other CSR matters is more difficult. U.K. 
legislation imposes the obligation on the directors for the consideration of, and disclosure 
of, CSR matters. It remains to be seen whether its approach in aligning shareholder value 
with the society as a whole, but without amending the Takeover Code, will be effective.  
 
 3.  Empirical studies on termination fees and lockups  
 
There are some limited empirical studies on the effects of termination fees and 
lockups in the U.S. transactions which suggest the following matters.233 First, deals with 
termination fees are associated with higher completion rates and with lower probabilities 
of third party competition. Thomas Bates and Michael Lemmon have shown that deals 
with termination fees have higher completion rates.234 A similar result in this respect is 
shown by the empirical study by Coates and Subramanian.235 Timothy Burch finds that 
deals with stock lockup options discourage competition and are associated with higher 
completion rates. Micah Officer reports that termination fees are associated with higher 
                                                 
233
  Canada has a rule similar to U.S. transactions and a recent study on the effect of termination fees 
are positively related to cash financing, disclosed expenses as a percentage of deal value, disclosure of 
operational synergies, the percentage toehold, family block shareholdings and weakly, CEO retention, 
suggesting show that such fees are more consistent with the explanation that target management agrees to 
such fees in the interests of the shareholders, rather than as a result of managerial self-interest. See Paul 
Andre, Samer Khalil & Michel Magnan, Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: Protecting 
Investors or Managers”, 34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 541 (2007).  
234
  Thomas W. Bates and Michael L. Lemmon, Breaking up is Hard to do? An Analysis of 
Termination Fee Provisions and Merger Outcomes, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 469.  
235
  Coates and Subramanian, supra note 2 at 347-353. 
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completion rates but finds that there is only weak evidence indicating termination fees 
deter bid competition.236  
 
 Second, termination fees are associated with either larger or neutral effects on 
takeover premium and announcement period returns. Thomas Bates and Michael 
Lemmon and Officer show that the target firms with termination fees clauses have 
somewhat higher transaction premiums and announcement period returns. Timothy Burch 
finds that lockup options discourage competitive bidders but suggests that shareholders 
are not harmed by their use. In contrast, Coates and Subramanian find that “foreclosing 
lockups”237 occur more often than suggested by earlier studies. They further find that 
higher premium is more likely with stock lockups but not with termination fees. 
 
To the author’s knowledge, there is no corresponding empirical study on the 
effect of termination fees in U.K. market. However, a recent study238 evaluating the data 
on deal protections in Australia239 show that the inducement fees in the Australian 
context (which has a similar rule as the U.K.) do not deter competitive bidding and are 
not correlated to deal completion and suggest that inducement fees have a detrimental 
effect on shareholder wealth (measured based on final bid premium and abnormal returns 
surrounding the bid announcement). The possible explanation given was that any 
beneficial effect of inducement fees is mitigated under a bright line rule. It is unclear if 
                                                 
236
  Micah S. Officer, supra note 177.  
237
  “Foreclosing lockups” is a term used by Ayres. See Ayres, supra note 8. 
238
  Larelle Chapple, Blake Christensen & Peter M. Clarkson, Termination Fees in a “Bright Line” 
Jurisdiction, 47 ACCT. & FIN. 643 (2007).  
239
  In Australia, the recommended cap is 1% of the equity value. See AUSTRALIAN TAKEOVERS 
PANEL, GUIDANCE NOTE 7: LOCK-UP DEVICES (Dec. 2001, last issued in Nov. 2007).  A break-fee 
exceeding 1% of the equity value will be examined by the Takeovers Panel to ensure that it is not anti-
competitive or coercive. 
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these results can be extrapolated into the U.K. due to the fact that there are significant 
differences in the shareholding patterns between the two jurisdictions; Australian publicly 
traded companies have a much higher proportion of concentrated share ownership 
compared to U.K. publicly traded companies240 and may be less reliant on deal 
protections granted by targets. 
 
It is submitted that the empirical studies do not provide clearly that deal 
protections are best explained as supporting the efficiency contracting justification, rather 
than as a device on management entrenchment, for the following reasons. First, while the 
empirical studies241 show that termination fees are positively associated with shareholder 
wealth and takeover returns, which support the efficiency contract justification, they also 
show that takeover competition is truncated and that they are associated with higher 
completion rates, which suggests agency costs.  
 
Second, many of the studies rely on data found in Thomson Financial Securities 
Data’s SDC Platinum Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database (“Thomson M&A 
database”), rather than data directly from the SEC filings of the companies. Recent work 
from Aura Boon and Harold Mulherin has shown that the data from Thomson M&A 
significantly under-reported the existence of termination fees in U.S. deals.242  
 
                                                 
240
  See Alan Dignam, Transplanting UK takeover culture: The EU Takeovers Directive and the 
Australian Experience, 4 INT’L J. OF DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 148 (2007). 
241
  See Bates & Lemmon, supra note 234; Officer, supra note 177. 
242
  Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Do Termination Fees Truncate the Takeover Bidding 
Process, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 461 (2007). 
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Third, most of the analyses have focused on the presence of the termination fee in 
the friendly transactions. However, the empirical studies by Bates and Lemmon and 
Officer on U.S. transactions, other than the study by Coates and Subramanian, do not 
specifically examine the relation between the magnitude of termination fees as compared 
to the deal completion rates, probabilities of third party competition or takeover 
transaction premium. These studies point to the fact of the presence of the termination 
fees or lockups but not to the size. Accordingly, it is submitted that the current empirical 





 This paper demonstrates that despite the apparent similarities in the shareholding 
ownership structures in the U.S. and U.K., there are significant differences in the 
regulation of deal protections in the two jurisdictions. The bright line rule prohibiting 
most types of termination fees and their functional equivalents in the U.K. is the product 
of a regime whose publicly traded companies were, until recently, dominated by domestic 
institutional shareholders which have influenced the development of a shareholder-
centric model. In contrast, the concentration of institutional shareholdings in U.S. 
occurred at a later time and the institutional shareholders have not been able to 
significantly influence the development of takeover regulation; such development was 
left to Delaware case law. The different processes of takeover regulation also result in the 
differing impact in relation to the wasted transaction costs; the bidder’s anticipated 
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transaction costs which would be wasted if the transaction does not close are likely to be 
higher in the U.S. than in the U.K.  
 
 This paper argues the despite the recent change in the shareholding patterns in 
U.S. and U.K., the existing regimes in approaching the issues relating to defensive 
measures, including deal protections, in the two jurisdictions are unlikely to change 
fundamentally. However, this paper raises two developments which may lead to a more 
modest review of the substantive rules. In the U.K., the increase in the use of change of 
control clauses raises the question as to whether the ceiling of 1% equity value on 
termination fees under-compensates the bidder, even as to its direct transaction costs.  In 
the U.S., the open question is whether in the light of recent regulatory development, 
significant stock ownership, or affiliation to significant shareholders, by outside directors, 
would impact their independence and disinterestedness in assessing defensive measures 
under Delaware law.  
 
Finally, despite the differences in the two systems of regulation, the analysis is 
that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that either the U.K.’s approach or the U.S. 
approach is superior either in relation to encouraging hostile bids or in not imposing other 
externalities. One remaining question is whether companies in either jurisdiction are 
better positioned to address CSR issues. U.K. has chosen to address CSR through the 
formulation of a duty on the board to consider the stakeholders’ interests and to disclose 
its CSR practices to the market. Further research will be required as to its approach in 
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aligning shareholder value with the society as a whole, but without amending the 
takeover regulatory framework, will be effective. 
 
Table 1 (M&A deals announced in 2006, 2007 and 2008)243  
 







 Friendly  
 Number Number % of (1) Number % of (1) 
U.S. 2361 90 3.8 2278 96.5 
U.K. 844 41 4.9 733 86.8 
 
Source: Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database 
 
                                                 
243
  Table 1 reports figures on M&A activity from 2006 to 2008 (inclusive) taken from Thomson 
Financial SDC Platinum, a subscription based service. Column (1) shows all of the MA&A transactions 
announced during this period for which the target firm is publicly traded located in the U.S. and U.K. 
respectively. Columns (2) and (3) show the number and percentage of transactions that were hostile or were 
unsolicited. Column (4) and (5) show the number and percentage of transactions that were friendly. SDC 
Platinum characterizes the deals as hostile, friendly, neutral and unsolicited.  
